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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on the heterogenous reactions of firms to shocks, with
particular empirical applications to the Chilean economy.
The first essay presents a model of heterogeneity in an economy with financial constraints.
The main issue in the model is to characterize the entrepreneurs and firms that are affected
by shocks or policy innovations. The model delivers a dual margin composed of a segment of
relatively poorer but more productive entrepreneurs and a segment of richer but less productive
entrepreneurs. The main result we present in this essay is that these two margins will react
heterogeneously to shocks in economically meaningful ways.
The second essay is devoted to the construction of the panel and the econometric use of the
FUNDES-SII panel firm database. We use this database to study firm creation, destruction
and performance on maps of firms. The main result of this essay is that there does seem to
be some empirical evidence of a margin of high productivity, low capital entrepreneurs for the
Chilean economy, as predicted in the first essay of the thesis. Finally, we find that among
smaller firms leverage seems to be an indicator of financial constraint, while among larger firms
it is an indicator of financial access.
The third essay is devoted to the construction of the panel and econometric use of the
INE-BFL panel worker database to study workplace creation and destruction in Chile. For
local interest, the main feature of the chapter is that it is the first time that representative and
consistent series of job creation and destruction that is made available for the Chilean economy.
The main feature of the chapter, however, is the estimation and characterization of workplace
fragility by firm size. We estimate separation, matching and bankruptcy probabilities, and
inquire into their sensitivity to the economic cycle.
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Introduction
The view that most economies have a sector of fragile entrepreneurs that
own small firms or have small entrepreneurial plans, and require the sup-
port of the governments to exist, has appeared frequently in development
economics. These small enterprises are seen as an important mechanism
for social mobility and equal opportunity, and their failure and fragility is
usually seen as a social defect of a market economy. The theoretical un-
derpinning for such a failure was first laid out by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
and has since become mainstream economic theory, with important practical
applications such as the microlending experiences.
On the other hand, the existence of a dynamic churning process, were
small firms try out new ideas, and are either selected to survive or, when
failing, scraped and their resources recycled into new projects, is seen by
macroeconomists as a virtue of a dynamic and modern economy. This view
has been with us since the inspiring work of Schumpeter (1942), and it
has had a recent expression in the work of Caballero and Hammour (1996)
and Caballero and Hammour (1998). The failure of an economy to churn
resources to truly productive projects is seen by them as an efficiency defect
of a modern market economy: what they call economic sclerosis.
Both views are perfectly compatible and probably coexist in a world of
heterogeneous entrepreneurs. We will argue that both views are different
faces of the same problem: the existence of a sensitive margin of fragile but
very productive entrepreneurs. In the following chapters we will understand
"fragility" not only as the possibility of a firm to go bankrupt or to close,
but also as the possibility that a competent entrepreneur will not be able
to implement a productive and socially desirable project. We will show
how a standard limited liability hidden action model can deliver socially
and economically meaningful multiple margins that react heterogeneously
to shocks and policy innovations. We will show evidence of this heterogeneity
from the Chilean economy, from the viewpoint of entrepreneurs (counting
firms) and workers (counting jobs) and attempt to characterize further the
characteristics of firms that predict these different events.
Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) show us evidence that investment among
smaller firms is much more sensitive to monetary policy than among larger
firms.' Moreover, Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) and Oliner and Rudebusch
(1996b) show that the shifting of bank credit away from small firms is a
salient feature of monetary contractions in the US. But this differential be-
havior of firms of different sizes can be found in many places. For example,
Forbes (2003) shows that the implementation of the Chilean capital flow
reserve requirement mechanism had a significantly larger (although transi-
tory) adverse effect on smaller firm's access to credit.2 Harris and Siregar
(1994), find evidence that Indonesian financial liberalization increased bor-
rowing costs more for smaller firms. Gelos and Werner (2002) find evidence
that the Mexican financial liberalization resulted in an easing of financial
constraints that was concentrated among smaller firms, and so forth.
There seems to be, in fact, a consensus that the size of a firm does seem
to, at the very least, correlate with the reaction to a crisis or a policy inno-
vation. However, there is less agreement on what characteristics of the firms
are delivering this differential sensitivity and on what is being proxied by
size in papers that use it as an independent variable. Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) explicitly argue that size is a good proxy for capital market access,
but other papers do not necessarily clarify what it is that we are talking
about. And there are alternatives: for example Hu (1999) shows that it is
highly leveraged firms which are more affected by a contraction in credit,
and Kashyap and Stein (1994) show that it is firms without access to bond
markets that are the ones that react to shocks with most intensity. All three
empirical findings are compatible and it is entirely possible that illiquidity,
excessive leverage and imperfect access to capital markets are theoretically
and empirically related.
Moreover, it is possible that different characteristics of the firms can com-
pound to make things even more difficult. For example Carpenter and Petersen
(2002) show that the classical cash flow effect on investment seems to be
'For example, they show that in a monetary contraction, large firms tend to borrow
and invest in inventories in preparation for the recovery of demand. Small firms, on the
other hand, tend to rapidly lower their inventories during the contraction.
2Gallego and Hernandez (2003) use a database of publicly traded firms to show that
relatively smaller firms increased their reliance on short term debt as a result of the reserve
requirement.
a particularly important restriction for the growth of smaller firms. 3 In
their case, they implicitly interpret "small" to be a proxy for "new" in the
Jovanovic (1982) sense and/or "owned by financially constrained entrepre-
neurs" in the Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) sense. 4 It is most likely that
different financial characteristics of the firms become more or less important
depending on the financial environment that surrounds them. Consider,
for example, an Allen and Gale economy5 where there is a pool of finan-
cial liquidity that can quickly become rationed after an aggregate shock.
In such an economy it is likely that firms with less liquid assets or thinner
cash flows such as those referred to by Oliner and Rudebusch (1996a) and
Carpenter and Petersen (2002) will be relatively more affected by aggre-
gate shocks. Consider, on the other hand, a Caballero and Krishnamurthy
emerging economy6 where there is a pool of internationally pledgable col-
lateral that becomes rationed when the country is hit by an international
shock. In such an economy one would expect firms with different access to
international finance, to react differently to the same shock 7. Hence, it is
very likely that the type of heterogeneity that will be relevant in predicting
the reaction of different firms will change from country to country and sector
to sector.
The empirical literature that documents heterogenous effects is usually
based on databases of relatively large and well established firms. 8 This is
3There is a somewhat paradoxical result available in Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989),
consisting on the find that cash flows are more important for large rather than small firms
among publicly traded UK companies. This result has not been replicated elsewhere to
our knowledge.
4Small firms are firms that are starting to discover their growth opportunities, cash
flow would be, it seems, a particularly important restriction on them. Hence, cash flows
would be a good predictor of their growth opportunities or productivity potential.
5See Allen and Gale (2004b) for a surveylike view of their work on the effect of liquidity
scarcity on asset prices (what they call Cash-in-the-Market Pricing) that can be found in
a family of papers that they have produced.
6See Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) and the family of papers that follows.
7Bleakley and Cowan (1995) find evidence of different effects of devaluations on large
Latin American firms conditional to the exchange rate composition of their debt and the
elasticity of their income to the exchange rate. Benavente and Morand6 (2003) find that
no such effects for Chilean firms after the 1998 Asian Crisis. The jury is basically out in
this type of literature.
5Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) use the Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing
Corporations, so they inherit all the biases that this particular sector can bring. This
can be particularly relevant when extrapolating conclusions towards small agricultural
commercial or service enterprises. Also due to the nature of their database the "cutoff'
for separating small from large firms is somewhere in the US$ 100 to 250 million range
for annual sales. This is clearly not what pepople have in mind when they talk of small
true of all the papers referred to in this section up to this point and is a
natural bias due to the difficulty of surveying financial data among finan-
cially fragile firms. Most of these papers are interested in the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy tightenings, exchange rate shocks or capital
account policies, so this is probably not a problem for their conclusions.
But, as far as statements on the distributive effects of shocks across differ-
ent types of entrepreneurs goes, they probably underestimate the adverse
effects. Hence, for our purposes, the evidence from these papers is motivat-
ing but not decisive, since most of the databases used in these studies are
biased towards relatively large firms.
We are interested in the fate of high quality entrepreneurs with low
financial resources in emerging markets, and we are interested in the effect
that this has on workers. Moreover, we are not only interested in the fate
of existing small entrepreneurs that either default or survive shocks and
regulatory changes. We are also interested in the effect of these shocks on
potential entrepreneurs and their decisions to enter or not into the economy.
This presents a difficult censorship problem that we have only seen dealt
with by Paulson and Townsend (2004) and Paulson and Townsend (2005),
we will comment below and deal with it in Chapter 3 of this dissertation.
In this dissertation we focus particularly on the Chilean economy. Both
empirical chapters are based on new Chilean databases. Chapter 2 uses a
new panel database containing all Chilean firms that have filed tax returns
for a period of six years (the FUNDES-SII panel). This thesis is only the
second academic work to use this type of data, the first to use it for this
particular period of time, and the first to submit it to extensive econometric
analysis. 9 This database has the advantage of containing some very coarse
financial data on a large and very representative sample of firms. Its main
businesses that create development and social mobility opportunities for poor households.
Forbes (2003) uses a database of publicly listed companies in Chile, so she is estimating
the effects of size among already relatively large companies, that have sufficient financial
acess to be admited into the Santiago Stock Exchange. Hu (1999) uses the Manufac-
turing Sector Master File which is composed of large, durable manufacturing companies.
Kashyap and Stein (1994) use a subset of this database, the Compustat companies of the
Compustat dataset.
9Crespi (2003) is the first work to use the FUNDES-SII database to study the vulnera-
bility of small firms in Chile. However, the period of that database (1990-1998) is different
from ours (1999-2004) and, due to procedural changes the databases are not fully com-
patible. Also we focus on a econometric decomposition of effects rather than an extensive
documentation of stylized facts.
defect is that it has almost no other information. Chapter 3 uses a panel
of workers constructed from the Chilean National Unemployment survey
(the INE-BFL panel) to study the fragility of jobs and attempts to trace
back to some characteristics of the firms. One of the main features of this
dissertation is that it is the first to present national and cross sector job
calculations of creation and destruction for Chile. This second database has
the advantage of being more representative of the real rather than the formal
economy, and since it counts jobs rather than firms it allows us to analyze
the fragility of workplaces.
Chile has, of course, interest in itself. But I will spend a couple of para-
graphs arguing that it is a particulary interesting economy to look at from
a more general perspective when one is interested in the problems faced by
entrepreneurs in emerging markets. Chile is well known as an early Wash-
ington Consensus reformer. Most of the policies that were adopted globally
by emerging economies during the 1990s (e.g. trade liberalization, privati-
zation and pension reform) had already been adopted in Chile during the
late 1970s and early 1980s. Generally, this has made the Chilean economy
a very attractive case for students of emerging market reforms. Moreover,
since it is a free market oriented economy and has been so for quite some
time,10 it offers the possibility of studying the effects of market failures
rather than the effects of government failure, which, are present but proba-
bly less important than in other emerging economies. Unfortunately, until
very recently, only static data has been available to study this economy, with
the specific exception of the National Industrial Survey (ENIA).This disser-
tation, together with other efforts1 1 attempts to bridge this deficit. 12 Also
by analyzing jointly two panel databases: one for firms and one for workers,
we attempt to advance a more comprehensive understanding of churning,
creative destruction and fragility in the Chilean economy.
10For example, Heritage, the well known conservative think tank ranks Chile in the 14th
place of its 161 country Economic Freedom Index (US is 9th, UK is 5th.)
"Notably the database being collected by the National Unemployment Insurance
System (see Cowan and Micco (2005)); also a database facilitated by one of the
major job-place safety insurance companies in the country (ACHS) and used by
Ferrada and Reinecke (2005) to estimate job flows; and the retrospective effort made in
the Social Protection Survey of the Microdata Center of the University of Chile (see Bravo(2005))
12For a more extensive view of Chilean economic history I recommend the following
books: Meller (1996) for a perspective of economic policies in Chile over the last cen-
tury, and Ffrench-Davis (2005) for the last three decades; Edwards and Cox (1991) and
Bosworth et al. (1994) for a review of the reforms conducted during the military dicta-
torship (1973-1989); and Meller (2005) for the post dictatorship democratic period (1990-
2005).
The Chilean economy can be characterized as fast growing for Latin
American standards, but displays relatively high unemployment rates and
growth volatility when compared to East Asian emerging markets. The pre-
dominance of certain commodities 13 in its exports and the relatively recent
development of massive retail commercial banking are usually seen as the
reasons behind the lesser role and fragility of smaller entrepreneurs. Chilean
economic fluctuations continue to be caused and explained by the fluctua-
tions of these commodities, and it is seen by many that entrepreneurship
outside of the large companies involved in commodity exports is a residual of
the economy, that may or may not be there at different points in time. The
development of a private economy beyond commodities is seen by many as
a social and economic priority, and a candidate area for government action.
There is less of a consensus on what specific policies should be involved in
a governmental action directed towards these objectives.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation is of a more general and applied theoretical
interest and presents a model of heterogeneity in an economy with financial
constraints. The main issue in the model is to characterize the entrepreneurs
and firms that are affected by shocks or policy innovations to the economy.
The model will show that in a heterogeneous economy there will be a dual
margin composed of a segment of relatively poorer but more productive
entrepreneurs and a segment of richer but less productive entrepreneurs. It
will show how the first segment will be relatively more sensitive to a variety
of shocks and policy innovations that we will make this economy endure.
We will submit it to changes in financial integration to the world, changes
in capital flow taxes, changes in the development and regulation of local
capital markets as well as international shocks. In all cases, the margin of
poorer and more productive entrepreneurs will be more sensitive to shocks.
The chapter also shows that scale can be an effective substitute for capital
endowments or productivity in the capital market and, hence, using size as
a proxy for financial constraints (which is very frequent in the literature and
we will implicitly do in Chapter 3) is compatible with our model. Finally,
the Chapter 1 shows that risk will affect the participation constraint more
by generating a flight of low quality projects, also risk will tend to increase
relatively the interest rates for poorer and more productive entrepreneurs.
Chapter 2 is devoted to the construction of the panel and the economet-
ric use of the FUNDES-SII database. We use this database to study firm
13Mostly copper, but also fish meal and cellulose.
creation, destruction and performance in Chile. In the chapter, we test for
reactions to macroeconomic and sectoral shocks of creation, destruction and
performance on maps of firms ordered in the space we used to derive the
model of Chapter 1. The main result of this part of the chapter is that there
does seem to be some empirical evidence of a margin of high productivity,
low capital entrepreneurs for the Chilean economy. The chapter also finds
that there is economically meaningful and significant heterogeneity among
Chilean firms. In particular, we show that the smallest firms in the economy
leverage is correlated with fragility in the sense that it predicts failure and
worse sales performances, while for all the rest of the firms (and very clearly
for the largest firms of the economy) the effects have the exact opposite
sign. We interpret this as a strong indication that leverage is an indicator of
financial constraint among small firms and of financial access among larger
firms. We finalize the chapter by illustrating in a multidimensional way the
sources and characteristics of heterogeneity among Chilean firms.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the construction of the panel and econometric
use of the INE-BFL database to study workplace creation and destruction in
Chile. For local interest, the main feature of the chapter is that it is the first
time that representative and consistent series of creation and destruction
are made available for the Chilean economy. For general interest, the main
feature of the chapter is estimation of the economic relevance of workplace
fragility in different sizes of firms. Once we control for sector and date
dummies as well as for the characteristics of workers it seems clear that
small firms are much more likely to destroy jobs and less likely to create
them. The steady state of jobs in smaller firms, it seems, is generated by
the mechanics of firm creation in the economy: new firms have to start
small. But, controlling for that, the jobs and workplaces in these firms are
more fragile. We also take advantage on a question on job destruction of the
survey to show that small firms are more likely to go bankrupt and we show
how this differential effect significantly increased after the Asian Crisis.
Both the second and third chapters of this dissertation have something
in common that is less related to the central theme of this dissertation but
of empirical importance to students of the Chilean economy and relatively
trivial byproducts from the statistical codes we used to estimate the main
results. We characterize the geographic and sector identity of the most frag-
ile firms and workplaces. We find them to be in the construction, commerce
and services sectors and hence mainly in highly urbanized regions of the
country. This emphasizes the importance (maybe even beyond the Chilean
experience) of looking at fragility in sector representative databases.
Chapter 1
The Model: Fragility and
Heterogeneity
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter we set up an economy with a typical hidden action infor-
mation asymmetry and heterogeneous entrepreneurs in wealth and in the
quality of their entrepreneurial ideas. We show that in an economy such as
this, the presence of an information asymmetry will generate dual margins
with differential sensitivity to shocks. We show that shocks tend to impact
most fiercely on a margin composed of poor entrepreneurs with high qual-
ity projects, and less on a margin of rich entrepreneurs with low quality
projects. The consequence of the model is that the same market failure
that scleroses the economy, minimizes the social and distributive impact of
entrepreneurship, by creating a fragile margin of poor but highly productive
entrepreneurs.
The most relevant methodological aspect of the model is the mapping
of the economy into a partition representing types of entrepreneurs that are
subject to different contracts and interest rates. Also, the margins of these
partitions may be constituted either by incentive constrained or participa-
tion constrained firms. This difference in the nature of the active constraint
determines differential sensibilities of these margins to different shocks. The
same basic methodological mechanism can be found in a corporate structure
model by Acemoglu and Newman (2002).
The logic of our model is best understood comparing two entrepreneurs:
a rich entrepreneur with a low quality project and almost enough resources
to finance it himself, and a poor entrepreneur with a high quality project
and almost no financial resources. From the bank's perspective the rich
entrepreneur can be trusted to exert effort since his incentives are almost
totally aligned with the project. The big question in lending to him will be
how high an interest rate can be charged without the entrepreneur abandon-
ing the project for the outside option. Hence, marginal rich entrepreneurs
will be participation constrained. On the other hand, enforcing effort is the
central issue when lending to the poor entrepreneurs. Hence, the bank will
demand higher productivity levels and/or higher interest rates to lend to
theses entrepreneurs. They will be incentive constrained. In this way, a
heterogeneous economy will present dual margins.
The incentive constrained margin will be more sensitive to shocks and
institutional innovations. The intuitive reason is that entrepreneurs on this
margin rely on their ability to extract productivity from the economy to ob-
tain credit from the banks. A deterioration of this ability will be very serious
for them. On the other hand the wealthy participation constrained entre-
preneurs rely mostly on their resources to credibly promise effort. Hence,
they will be less sensitive to shocks and institutional innovations.
We explore two extensions an generalizations of the model. First, we
find that in this context most risk sources will end up depleting the econ-
omy of wealthy entrepreneurs with relatively low productivity projects and
increasing interest rates for poor entrepreneurs with relatively high pro-
ductivity projects. The logic behind this is that participation constrained
entrepreneurs will be comparing projects inside the risky economy, with
projects outside it, while incentive constrained entrepreneurs will be in ef-
fect comparing two alternative projects inside the risky economy (the one
with shirking and the one without it).
Second, we find that a model in which we add an additional source of
heterogeneity: scale or size, does replicate the stylized fact that fragility is
mostly seen among small firms. The intuition is that as long as effort is
not completely proportional to size (as long as there is a fixed cost), scale
will substitute for productivity. Hence, larger firms will be less sensitive to
shocks and we will observe lower interest rates and more productive projects
with increased scale.
This model is clearly connected to the volatility and credit market incom-
pleteness literature pioneered by Greenwald and Weiss (1984) and further
developed in papers such as Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Aghion et al.
(2002) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1992). In any case, the objective of most of
this literature is to show how the market failure increases macroeconomic
volatility. In this chapter we take this for granted and explore the dis-
tributive and efficiency aspects of macroeconomic fluctuations in economies
with incomplete markets of the same sort but with economic and socially
meaningful heterogeneity.
The model is also related somewhat with the credit monetary transmis-
sion literature studied empirically by papers such as Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) and Ashcraft and Campello (2002)), also surveyed and documented
by Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Again this literature seeks usually to quan-
tify the importance of these constraints and uses heterogeneity in size as an
instrument that approximates financial constraints. Towards the end of the
paper we show that using size as an instrument in this way is consistent
with our model. However, we wish to explain the heterogeneous reactions
by understanding how the characteristics of firms and entrepreneurs affect
contracting rather than use the characteristics as an instrument.
The model is also somewhat related to the liquidity shortages and fi-
nancial crises literature developed by Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001)
and Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2002) for balance of payments crises
in emerging markets, and by Allen and Gale (2004a) and Allen and Gale
(2004b) in a more general financial context. This literature emphasizes
financial transmission of shocks towards firms with illiquid assets, and par-
ticularly the effect of illiquidity on financial prices such as the exchange rate
or the stock market. One could extend the conclusions of this literature to
construct a plausible explanation for the higher sensitivity to shocks and
the fragility of smaller or poorer entrepreneurs. We do not use these types
of models in our paper, our financial market is extremely simplistic, but
we view our explanation as complementary rather than competing with this
one.
The chapter is organized in the following way: Sections 1.2 to 1.5 present
the model and develops the main results of the paper, the mapping of the
economy into different types of contracts and the differential sensitivities
of different margins to shocks and institutional innovations. Section 1.6
explores the effects of international recessions, international interest rate
hikes, capital controls and financial liberalizations, financial development,
improvements to the contracting environment, microfinance and technical
support. Section 1.7 presents extensions to the main model, the introduc-
tion of risk and the introduction of size heterogeneity. We end with the
conclusions in Section 1.8. Also Appendices B and C of this dissertation
correspond to proofs and derivations for this chapter.
1.2 Dual Economy with Heterogeneity
1.2.1 Setup of the Economy
Consider the following static hidden action problem in the midst of compet-
itive markets (for banking and output) and risk neutral individual agents
(firms and banks). Firms live only to attempt the execution of a single en-
trepreneurial project, and banks live only to provide intermediated finance
for these projects. There is a single good in this economy that will serve as
a numeraire. The output market is a spot market for this single good. The
banking market is an intertemporal market for this good that lasts for one
period.
Entrepreneurs can decide not to contract with the bank or the bank
may decide that it is not willing to lend. In that case, the entrepreneur
can deposit it's wealth outside of the economy at the risk free interest rate
r. The banking sector is competitive and exogenous to this economy and
demands the same risk free gross interest rate of r for riskless loans.
There is a continuum of agents with mass 1 that are heterogeneous in
two dimensions: the proportion of internal funds (0 < k < 1) as a percent
of the investment required for each project, and the quality of the project
or productivity (0 < 7 < 1) as a percent of the aggregate productivity of
the economy (W). Both k and ir are observable to the banks and W will be
assumed to be exogenous.
All entrepreneurial projects will require an investment of 1 and will be
implemented if the agent is able to raise from the banks the 1 - k that he
lacks. Banks are risk neutral, face no quantum credit constraints but face
limited liability when lending to entrepreneurs in this economy since agents
have no wealth other than k. All projects have the following identical pro-
duction function: with probability Ps it will render 7rW and with probability
1 - ps it will fail and render 0. Output is also sold in an exogenous com-
petitive environment where the production of a firm of productivity 7r is
sold for irW. The probability of success of the project will depend on an
universally observable effort decision of cost c made by the entrepreneur. If
the agent makes an effort he will have a success probability of Ph for his
project, otherwise the success probability will be pl which is lower. Hence
expected gross output by a project of quality 7r will be
E[y phrW - c if high effort is exerted
plJrW if low effort is exerted
1.3 Perfect Information
Call A = {{H, L, O}i} C R2 the set of all possible partitions of space B =
[0, 1] x [0,1] such that HULUO = B and H nLnO = 0. Sets H, L
and O describe collections of entrepreneurs described by a pair (7r, k). H
is the set of entrepreneurs that are financed to execute their project with a
high level of effort, a set of firms that we will call Tier 1 from now on. L,
is the set of entrepreneurs that are financed to execute their project with
a low level of effort, and we will call Tier 2 henceforth. Finally set 0, is
the set of entrepreneurs that decide to invest outside the economy. Call
R = (Rh, R1) E R2 a vector describing the interest rate structure of this
economy. Equilibrium in this economy is described by (P, R) E A x R2 such
that all entrepreneurs maximize their expected profits and banks comply
with the zero profit free entry condition.
Hence, set S E {H, L} is the subset of entrepreneurs that, producing
inside the economy, maximize their expected positive profits
U(s) = ps (7rW - (1 - k)R,) - kr - c, (1.2)
by choosing s E {h,l}, where {ch,Cl} = {c,0}. Set O, on the other hand,
is the subset of entrepreneurs that obtain negative results in (1.2) for any
choice of s and choose to produce outside of the economy to obtain a risk
free return of kr, and is characterized in the definition of A.
Scalars {R,} are the interest rates that are charged by the banks to
entrepreneurs belonging to each set S. Under perfect information the level
of effort exerted is universally observable, so banks will finance all projects
that accept to exert effort S and pay rate R, such that zero expected profit
condition
Rsps = r (1.3)
is satisfied for each penny loaned. Hence, equation (1.3) fully characterizes
equilibrium interest rates in this economy.
We can characterize the first best perfect information equilibrium in the
following way: firms can only be expected to sign the high effort contract if
they have drawn 7r larger than:
(r + c)P I
rpch = ( (1.4)W
so we will refer to threshold (1.4) as the high effort participation compati-
bility constraint or PCH henceforth. On the other hand, firms can only be
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Figure 1.1: First Best Economy
expected to sign the low effort contract if they have drawn 7r larger than:
-1
rp l
prPcd = W (1.5)
so we will refer to threshold (1.5) as the low effort participation compatibility
constraint or PCL henceforth. Firms can only be expected to prefer the low
effort contract to the high effort one if they have drawn 7r smaller than:
c(ph - P )-1
c7bl - h (1.6)W
so we will refer to threshold (1.5) as the low effort boundary or BL hence-
forth.
Like all other results and proofs in section 2, equations (1.4)-(1.6) are
derived and developed in B, and are simply the development of (1.2) subject
to (1.3).
Sets H are the lightly shaded areas in Figure 1.1 and sets L are the darker
shaded areas. Under perfect information, firms are solely discriminated
according to their productivity and the level of internal finance or the capital
owned by the entrepreneur is totaly irrelevant.
We can have two types of economy. Panel (a) of Figure 1.1 represents
the case where 7rpcl >2 7pch Ž 7rbl
, 
which holds as long as Ph -P > c. PanelPI -r(b) represents the case where 7rbl > 7rpch > 7rpcl, which holds as long as
pP' -< "c. Economies (a) and (b) both preserve their first best character andPI - r
1
i I
have no discrimination among firms by any criteria other than productivity.
Economy (a) has only one tier of firms that all exert high effort and, from
(1.3), pay rph1 for every penny they are loaned. On the other hand economy
(b) has two tiers of firms. In addition to the tier 1 firms of economy (a),
there is a second tier of firms that will produce inside the economy but not
exert effort and, from (1.3), pay rp, 1 for every penny they are loaned.
Ratio 2Lh-P is a measure of the relative gain in success probability that
is derived from effort, since it compares the increase in success probabilities
derived from effort with the success probability that the project will have if
no effort is exerted. Ratio f is a measure of the relative cost of effort since
it compares the cost of effort with the alternative use of those resources. As
long as the gain derived from effort is higher than the cost, we will be in
economy (a) with only one tier. When the gain is lower than the cost we
can have a two tier (b) economy, where only very high productivity firms,
that have, in a sense, a lot of productivity to protect with their effort will
choose high effort finance. Also, among the Tier 2 firms there will be two
types. Firms in the lrpch --7rp. range do not derive positive expected returns
from effort, but can make a profit executing without effort. On the other
hand firms in the 7rbl - lrpch range expect to derive profits from a low or high
effort execution of their project. However, since their productivity is low,
when they compare the expected gain from effort with the cost, they prefer
low effort finance.
During the next subsections we will assume that effort is relatively im-
portant, so that 2 E> and th at the first best version of the economy thatPA - r
we distort with a market failure will be the one tier economy represented in
panel (a) of Figure 1.1.
1.4 Setup of the Market Failure and the Contract
There are three features that make this a plausible model for an emerging
economy. First, it is an economy that depends entirely on international cap-
ital markets to finance the implementation of it's most profitable projects
(mass 1 of entrepreneurs has k < 1). Second it is a financially open economy
that faces an exogenous risk free rate (r). Third, there is relevant multidi-
mensional heterogeneity including entrepreneurs with good ideas but very
little capital (small k and high 7r). Two other characteristics of emerging
markets that are useful to introduce are relatively high information costs
and costly monitoring. These two characteristics will serve us to set up the
market failure of this paper.
t=O t=1 t=2
Agent draws Is informed Decides to Paymentsproject on contract Is inspected if Paymentsproject on convest picked, is are made if
productivity parameters and invest, pfined, I project
and knows k for contract decides if uncovered is succesfulllevel of effort
Contract becomes Realization of
enforceable and uncertainty,
irreversible sucessfull and failed
projects are sorted
Figure 1.2: Timing of Events
The hidden action problem comes from making effort non observable.
Faced with this asymmetric information problem, we will assume that the
exogenous banking sector will be able to make use of a costless inspection
technology. With probability q it will inspect a firm expected to be expend-
ing effort, and will fine it by the amount f if it finds it not to be doing so.
Both q and f are exogenous to this economy and are costlessly applied to
each marginal firm. The contract signed by the entrepreneur is character-
ized by {k, Rs, q, f, s}; s {h, l}. The contract specifies the amount of the
loan (1 - k), the rate of the loan (Rs = rp-1l,s E {h, }), the level of effort
expected (h or 1), the probability of inspection q and the level of the fine f.
The sequencing of events is presented in figure 1.2, and unfolds in the
following way: an agent of capital k draws a project of productivity 7r,
informs himself of the parameters of the contract available in the exogenous
banking sector, decides to contract or not (an how) and the level of effort to
exert. Once the contract is signed, the firm is subjected to the inspection
draw and fined if uncovered to be shirking under a high effort contract.
Then, uncertainty is realized, and successful and failed projects are sorted
out. Successful projects repay the loan, failed projects do not pay since
there is limited liability.
1.5 Hidden Action
Equilibrium in this economy again is described by a pair (P, R) E A X R2+
just as in section 2.2, in which all entrepreneurs maximize their expected
profits and banks comply with the zero profit free entry condition. Just as in
the first best economy, entrepreneurs choose in what subset of the partition
they prefer to be. However, since effort is not observable any more, they
must choose considering the whole of the contract described in section 2.3.
So the entrepreneurs problem is modified slightly from (1.2), it is now to
maximize:
U(s, z) = p, (7rW - (1 - k)Rz) - kr - c, - qf(z, s) (1.7)
by choosing actual effort s E {h, l} and promised effort z E {h, 1}, where
{Ch, c1} = {c, 0} as before, but now also
f(z, s)={ if Z z s (1.8)0 if z = s
and since we have assumed the inspection technology of the banks to be free
(very cheap or just rationed) banks will lend so that the zero profit condition
(1.3) is satisfied for every penny lent.
We can characterize the imperfect information equilibrium equilibrium
of this economy in the following way. Firms owned by entrepreneurs with
capital k can credibly promise to exert effort if they have drawn 7r larger
than:
(1 - k)rpj 1 + (c - fq)(ph - p()-1
7rich = (1.9)W
so we will refer to constraint (1.9) as the high effort incentive compatibility
constraint or ICH henceforth. It is important to notice that equation (1.9)
has a negative slope on the {7r, k} plane. Set H of Tier 1 firms will be
bounded from below by the upper envelope of equations (1.9) and (1.4). Set
L of Tier 2 firms (if existent) will be bounded from below by (1.5) and from
above by the lower envelope of the lower bound of the aforementioned Tier
1 set.
Figure 1.3 shows the effect of the market failure on this economy. Con-
sider panel (a), two notorious things happen as a result of non observable
effort. First, a whole section of the economy (triangle ACD) looses it's ac-
cess to high effort interest rates. The losers tend to be highly productive
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Figure 1.3: Dual Margins and Dual Economies
firms that are the property of poorer entrepreneurs. The most productive
among these losers (subtriangle ABE), manage to stay eligible for low effort
interest rates. These firms stop exerting effort but continue to produce, al-
beit with more expensive financing. Compared to the first best economy of
Subsection 2.2, there are two sources of welfare loss: the entrepreneurs of
rectangular trapeze BCDE seize to produce inside the economy and the fall
in expected profits for entrepreneurs of triangle ABE.
The information asymmetry has created an economy with a triple margin
and dual tiers of firms. Margin DF is a participation constrained margin con-
formed of the least productive active entrepreneurs of the economy. These
entrepreneurs are relatively wealthy and are able to secure low cost finance
for their projects. Since they have abundant internal resources to invest in
the project, their incentives are aligned with the project and the ICH con-
straint is not binding (they are betting mostly with their own money). Mar-
gin DE is a incentive constrained margin of less wealthier entrepreneurs that
compensate this handicap with an increasing level of productivity. Margin
BE is a participation constrained margin conformed of the most productive
marginal entrepreneurs of this economy. These entrepreneurs are relatively
poor and are able to secure only high cost finance for their projects. Finally,
margin EA is an internal margin of this economy, a frontier between Tier
1 and Tier 2 projects (and consequently high or low interest rates). It is
a incentive constrained margin composed of projects of the highest qual-
ity owned by the poorest entrepreneurs. Generally speaking, however, this
economy could look like the one in panel (b) where there is no Tier 2 and
the economy only has a dual margin. In subsection 2.4 below, we discuss
what can move an economy from looking like (a) to looking like (b).
Notice that the intersection of the ICH and the PCH occurs at:
S(fq Ph (1.10)
r Ph - P r Ph - P
so the sufficient condition for this economy to have a dual margin is that the
relative benefit of effort P is larger than the cost of effort E. This is the
same condition that we needed in section 2.2 to have a first best economy
with only one tier like the one represented in panel (a) of Figure 1.1. Hence,
under these conditions the existence of a second tier and the existence of a
dual margin can both be attributed to the market failure that results in the
imposition of the ICH constraint. More generally, if the effect of effort were
not so large, and our first best baseline were panel (b) of Figure 1.1, k could
be larger than 1 or not. In any case, the effect of the market failure would
be to create a dual margin between tiers and to deny low cost finance to a
triangle of highly productive yet relatively poor entrepreneurs.
Also note that introducing a more general effort function does not alter
qualitatively the model, but does change the geometry and reduce it's ele-
gance. Consider a function c(7r) such that more productive projects require
more effort. Equations (1.4)-(1.6) will not be affected in their forms (they
will continue to be flat) but may be affected in their sensitivity to parame-
ters. On the other hand, equation (1.9) will cease to be a line. If the effort
function is concave (which is the most reasonable assumption), then the ICH
will be convex, so that incentive compatibility does not relax very much with
grater k, but does so with greater 7r. Conversely the ICH will be concave
if the effort function is convex. So, the model is not altered substantially,
as it will not if we introduce more general inspection effectiveness functions
In the following subsections, we will do comparative statics on the three
margin two tier economy of panel (a) in Figure (1.3).
1The slope of the ICH from equation (1.9) with a general function c(7r) rather than c is:
8= - . It is negative, and becomes less negative with r if the effort cost functionik WcocaV.
is concave.
1.6 Comparative Statics of the Dual Economy Model
1.6.1 Capital Flows and Capital Controls
We can represent capital controls in this economy as taxes either on capital
inflows or outflows. A tax on inward capital flows will also be equivalent to a
shock to the idiosyncratic rates that local firms face in international capital
markets.2 Conversely we can represent a capital control on outward flows
as a tax that diminishes the profitability of investing in the risk free outside
option. So the entrepreneurs problem is again modified slightly from (1.7),
it is now to maximize:
U(s, z) = ps (7rW - (1 - k)(1 + ti)Rz) - kr(1 - t,,out) - cs - qf(z, s) (1.11)
by choosing actual effort s E {h, l} and promised effort z E {h,1}, where
{Ch, C} = {c, 0} and
f(z, s)= { if Z }s (1.12)0 if Z = s
where tout is the tax on capital outflows and tin is the tax on capital inflows.
Banks will continue to lend so that the zero profit condition (1.3) is satisfied
for every penny lent.
The new thresholds are
(1 - k)(1 + tin)rph 1 + (c - fq)(Ph - pl)-1
•ich = (1.13)W
((1 - t,,out)r + c - rk(tout + tin))Ph
Tpch W
((1 - tout)r - rk(tout + tin))p1
7rpcl = wW
and are derived in B.
An ad-valorem tax of rate t either on outward or inward capital flows
will drive a wedge between the passive and active interest rates faced by this
2 A shock could be a diminishment in the international taste for assets in this economy,
such as shifts to quality in international capital markets that drives lenders away from
emerging markets, or an expected devaluation of the currency for some reason exogenous
to our model.
economy.3 Geometrically this will cause both participation constraints to
acquire a slope since the alternative cost of funds will now be different from
the marginal cost of credit that firms face.
The inflow tax will be increasingly costly for poorer entrepreneurs, since
a larger proportion of their investment will be financed with credit. The out-
flow tax (levied only on residents), on the other hand, will usher investment
into the economy by reducing the returns of the outside option. This effect
will be stronger for richer entrepreneurs that actually have funds to invest in
the outside option. Moreover, the PCL constraint will become steeper than
the PCH constraint for the same tax, since the tax is not affecting the cost
of effort which is an important part of the high effort participation choice
but is not part of the low effort participation choice. On the other hand,
the effect on the participation constraint is totally different in one case or
the other. The incentive constraint compares two options for executing the
project inside the economy considering the cost of effort. The tax on capital
inflow makes the return from effort lower. The tax on capital outflow does
not affect this constraint, rather, it affects the constraints that compare an
option inside the economy with an option outside the economy. Hence, the
ICH constraint will become more restrictive in the case of a tax on inflows
and will not change in the case of a tax on outflows.
Figure (1.4) shows the effects of taxes on capital flows on this economy.
Panel (a) shows the effect of a tax on capital inflows. The lighter shaded
area represents Tier 1 firms that are downgraded to Tier 2 and consequently
charged a higher interest rate. The darker shaded area indicates firms that
are no longer financed. As a result of the pivoting of the constraints that
was discussed in the previous paragraph, the majority of the adverse effects
are on poorer entrepreneurs with projects of relatively high productivity.
Panel (b) shows the effect of a tax on capital outflows. The darker shaded
area indicates new projects that are financed as Tier 2, and the lighter
shaded area indicates new projects that are financed as Tier 1. As a result of
the pivoting of the constraints that was discussed in the previous paragraph,
new low quality projects are financed among relatively rich entrepreneurs,
although they would have preferred to invest abroad.
Finally panel (c) indicates an economy that closes financially, that is,
that levies a tax on all capital outflows or, equivalently, a tax on inflows
3Here, for purely expositional purposes we assume that the a capital flow that has been
charged when coming in is not charged when it goes back out (when credit is settled).
Moreover, conceptually a tax on capital outflows is a tax on all capital flows that are
relevant for this economy. So the capital outflow tax that we present is a capital outflow
tax on residents in the economy.
(a) tax on capital Inflows (b) tax on capital outflows, (c) finnclial closing, light shade
or shock to idlosyncratic credit cost, light shaded areas Indicate new project Indicates new projects finsnced, dark
light shaded areas indicate old projects financed at low rates, dark shade Indicate shade Indicates old projects whose
whose interest rate rises, darkers shaded new projects financed at high ratesa. interest ises, black shade indicatea
areas Indicate projects that are lost. lost projects.
Figure 1.4: Capital Controls, Taxes on Capital Flows or Shocks, and Closing
the Economy Financially
from non-residents and a tax on outflows from residents. The light shaded
areas indicate new firms that come into existence as a result of the financial
closing of the economy. The darker shaded area indicates Tier 1 firms that
are downgraded to Tier 2, and the black areas indicate firms that loose
access to finance. The result of the financial closure of this economy, is a
transfer of finance from high quality projects owned by poor entrepreneurs
to low quality projects owned by rich entrepreneurs, and an aggregate loss
of welfare.
The effect of capital flow taxes in this model can be interpreted to rep-
resent the effects of any form of imperfect or costly access to international
lending by domestic entrepreneurs. Quantum restrictions such as capital
controls and quantum total lending constraints faced by countries can be
interpreted as a convex tax function t(L) that is a function of total lending
to the economy L.4 In this case, equilibrium continues to be described by
the partition of entrepreneurs into three sets, plus an equilibrium tax rate,
but it is no longer constrained efficient due to the assumed externality. A
development of policy choices faced by the government of such an economy
is developed in section 3.2 below.
In the following subsection, I will do comparative statics on a three
margin two tier economy, such as the one I use in Figure (1.4) that faces
some form of imperfect access to international lending. Hence, participation
4 A microfoundation of how a country can end up sharing assets when dealing with
international credit markets can be found in the series of papers by Caballero and Krish-
namurthy quoted in the References.
constraints will have a slope, as we have derived in this subsection.
1.6.2 Financial Policies and Development
Financial development can be represented in this model by an increase in
the enforceability of the promise to expend high effort. Hence, it can be
represented by an increase in the expected fine fq. This increase affects
only the ICH constraint as is clear from inspecting equation array (1.13).
Panel (a) of Figure 1.5 shows the increase in the expected fine as a par-
allel relaxation of the ICH constraint. The light shaded area is the set firms
that are upgraded from Tier 2 to Tier 1 status, the dark shaded area is the
set of new projects that become eligible for finance. Three things are impor-
tant to notice. First, the effect is concentrated among poorer entrepreneurs
with higher quality projects. The reason for this is that entrepreneurs on
this margin are "working with other peoples money" so their main prob-
lem is contracting and promising effort. Second, all the new projects are
financed as Tier 1, since low effort contracting is not affected. Third, a neg-
ative shock to financial contracting, such as reduced enforceability, or even
a credibility shock were international banks adjust downwards their belief
about q, will have the same effects in reverse: concentrating it's effect on
incentive constrained, poor, highly productive entrepreneurs. In the limit,
by implementing policies that increase enforceability from abroad and trans-
parency, economies will transit from the three margin two tier configuration
of panel (a) of Figure 1.3 to the two margin one tier configuration of panel
(b).
An alternative to increasing fq for the whole economy is to lower the
technological cost of effort c. This is a very common type of policy towards
poorer and smaller entrepreneurs. The effect of a subsidy to c is shown
in panel (b) of Figure (1.5) and it's magnitudes are straightforward from
equation array (1.13). Geometrically it is a parallel shift downward of all
the constraints, although the effect will be different for each of them. There
will be a large area of new firms financed as a result of the policy, an these
firms will be of all qualities and types of owners. The effect, however, will
be larger for poorer entrepreneurs for two reasons. First, there will be an
area of poor but productive Tier 2 entrepreneurs that will be upgraded to
Tier 1. Second, the effect of the reduced technological cost of effort on the
ICH constraint will be larger than on the PCH constraint since promising
effort is much more critical for incentive constrained entrepreneurs than for
participation constrained entrepreneurs. Hence, even if technical support is
not focalized on poorer entrepreneurs, it will end up having a larger effect
(a) financial development (b) technical support
and contracting environment
Figure 1.5: Financial Development and technical support
on them since it is they who are on the incentive constrained margin.
Notice that a development policy that provides technical support to the
projects, that is, that increases 7 for all firms (or for all that request it) will
shift all margins down in the same distance, and hence relax the constraints
of entrepreneurs of all k and i. This policy can, of course, be focalized
on poorer entrepreneurs with higher quality projects. However, the policy
of providing technical support to the effort associated with the contracting
problem will naturally be focalized on poorer entrepreneurs that own higher
quality projects.
Microfinance policies, usually consisting of small and cheap loans to poor
entrepreneurs (usually to entrepreneurial cooperatives) can be introduced
in a simple way into this model by assuming that the development agency
gives a gift of a(1 - k) to every entrepreneur of capital k. Unfortunately,
the development agency will face a hidden action problem in verifying that
entrepreneurs actually end up investing in the project and do not deposit the
funds (incremented with the subsidy) in the risk free outside option. This
turns out to be critical when evaluating the effects of this policy. Panel (a)
of Figure 1.5 shows the effect on this economy of microfinance policy a when
investment by the entrepreneur is verifiable by the development agency. All
three constraints pivot in the same way that they would if the outflow tax
were lowered. Moreover, the effect on the PCL constraint is larger than
the effect on the PCH and ICH constraints (which are equal), once again
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Figure 1.6: Microfinance
because an increase in capital directly targets the whole problem that a low
effort entrepreneur faces, while the high effort entrepreneurs problem with
the cost of effort is not being helped directly.
In panel (a) we can see very high creation of high quality firms among
poorer entrepreneurs. In panel (b) we make it impossible for the develop-
ment agency to verify if the subsidized entrepreneur actually invested or
just deposited its increased funds at rate r. The effect on participation con-
straint almost disappears (see B). In fact, in panel (b) at k = 0, the effect
on both participation constraints will be smaller than in panel (a) by the
proportion t/(1 + t). Panel (c) shows how the effect completely disappears
when t -- 0 if investment is not verifiable by the subsidiser.
In the following subsection, we will do comparative statics on the simpler
economy with no taxes to capital flows.
1.6.3 International Shocks
International recessions for this economy are a general fall in the aggregate
gross productivity W from which firms extract with varying degrees of effi-
ciency. Panel (a) of Figure (1.7) shows a the effect. As proven in B, the effect
will be larger for marginal firms of higher productivity (the darker shade in
the figure). Intuitively this is due to the fact that these firms depend almost
completely on their capability of extracting from aggregate productivity to
convince banks to lend to them. Moreover, they depend on their capacity to
extract productivity to convince themselves to participate, so even the PCL
constraint will contract significantly. In this case, there will be a relatively
large mass of the most productive firms owned by the poorest entrepreneurs
m T i ,.
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Figure 1.7: Capital Controls, Taxes on Capital Flows or Shocks, and Closing
the Economy Financially
that will be downgraded from Tier 1 to Tier 2.
An international increase in interest rates is similar to the international
recession in the way it moves the constraints, but different in the relative
size of the adjustments of each margin. In this case (see B), the PCL margin
adjust the most since it is these firms that are exclusively comparing pro-
ductivity with outside options (with no role for effort). The ICH constraint
will pivot on k = 1 since firms that finance themselves with internal funds
will not feel that the financial cost of effort has changed very much when
the interest rate increases. Finally, as k -- 0 the effect on the ICH and PCH
constraints becomes the same, since the absence of internal funds becomes
the overriding problem in both deciding to participate and convincing cred-
itors to loan at the low rate. In this case, once again, the most affected
projects are high quality ones owned by poorer entrepreneurs. A nuance of
this last shock is that projects of middle income entrepreneurs are affected
less than those of richer entrepreneurs. This happens because the richest
entrepreneurs are participation constrained and will move their funds to the
outside riskless option very quickly. Middle income entrepreneurs don't have
enough funds to make that option profitable. On the other hand, credit is
not such a large proportion of their funding as for poorer entrepreneurs.
1.6.4 Summary
I have shown how a very simple static economy with heterogeneous entre-
preneurs can have firms with dual access to credit (two tiers of financed
firms and non financed firms), although projects are identical. I have shown
how this can depend on the existence of a simple asymmetric information
problem of the hidden action variety with the absence of externalities. I
have shown how this economy can also display dual or even triple margins,
and how these margins have different sensitivities to a variety of shocks and
policies. In all cases, the effects of shocks (positive and negative) as well
as different varieties of development policies are larger on the margin com-
posed of poorer entrepreneurs. The central feature of this paper is that these
poorer and more sensitive entrepreneurs happen to own the most productive
marginal projects in the economy.
1.7 Extensions and Generalizations, Risk and Size
1.7.1 Risk
Up to this point we have assumed that the entrepreneurs of this economy
are risk neutral. Also, the banks do not face any risk since they hold port-
folios composed of a continuum of identical entrepreneurial projects. In this
section we will introduce different types of risk, and analyze how it affects
the mapping of this economy into different credit contracts zones.
Call vx - v(E, x) any mean preserving shock that affects a parameter
x of the economy with a standard deviation of e. In order to remember
them we can label the shocks in the following way: call v, domestic produc-
tivity risk, v, international credit risk, and v, domestic institutional risk.
Two of these types of risk are domestically generated, and one is imported,
but all are exogenous to the problem. Assume that entrepreneurs have a
concave utility function U(.). As a result the entrepreneurs problem is mod-
ified slightly from program (1.7). Now each entrepreneur has to maximize
expected utility:
EU(s, z) = EU P. (7r (W + vw) k)(r + vr)pz (1.14)
- k(r + vr) - c, - qf(z, s)
by choosing actual effort s C {h, l} and promised effort z E {h, 1}, only now
{ch, C1} = {c + vc, 0}, and as before
f(z, s) = if z :A (1.15)
0 if z = s
and, we are already assuming in equation (1.14), that the zero profit con-
dition (1.3) is satisfied for every penny lent.5 For the sake of simplicity, we
have assumed that the cost of effort cs is potentially subject to risk, and not
the monitoring probability q or the fine function f(z, s), since introducing
the mean preserving shock to any of them delivers the same results.
We can characterize the imperfect information equilibrium equilibrium
of this economy in a similar way to that of section 2.4. Firms owned by
entrepreneurs with capital k and productivity 7r can credibly promise to
exert effort if:
EU(1, h) < EU(h, h) (1.16)
which is our incentive compatibility constraint. Firms will be willing to
participate in high effort contracts only if:
0 < EU(h, h) (1.17)
which is our high effort participation constraint PCH and they will be willing
to participate in low effort contracts only if:
0 < EU(1, 1) (1.18)
which is our low effort participation constraint PCL.
Since all shocks are mean preserving and independent and the utility
function is concave, all expected utilities will fall as a result of an amplifi-
cation of any source of risk. The transition from an economy with no risk
to one with risk will be a particular case of the amplification of C. Hence,
from equations (1.17) and(1.18) we see that both the PCL and the PCH will
tighten as a result of an increase in any of the three types of risk sources,
with the exception of domestic institutional risk v, that will not have an
effect on the PCL constraint, since the enforcement of effort is not relevant
for this type of contract.
It is interesting to note from equation (1.14) that the domestic produc-
tivity shock is amplified by ir and ps. This will mean two things. First,
that the constraint will tighten more for higher productivity marginal firms.
5Instead of the term Rz that we had in equation (1.7) we have the explicit interest rate
when the zero profit constraint is satisfied: rp-1
Second, that the PCH constraint will tighten more than the PCL constraint,
since the shock has a grater amplification. The intuition is simple: entre-
preneurs that would have contracted high effort credit contracts have more
riding on productivity than others. Uncertainty on these return will dis-
courage them from signing these contracts and committing to high effort.
Also note that the international credit risk v, will have the same effect on
both EU(h,h) and EU(1,1), and will have the same effect on entrepreneurs of
all productivity levels and wealth. These effects are represented in Figure
1.8. Proofs can be found in C.
To see the effect of risk on the ICH constraint we must see if EU(l,h) or
EU(h,h) tightens more with an the amplifications of E. The simplest case
is the amplification of domestic institutional risk (v,), since this random
variable is in EU(h,h) (which will fall) but not in EU(l,h). Hence, an increase
in domestic institutional risk will unambiguously tighten the ICH constraint,
making it less possible to credibly commit not to shirk.
The amplification of international credit risk (v,) generates different ef-
fects on EU(h,h) and EU(l,h). In C, we prove that the ICH will pivot and
tighten less than the PCH and PCL constraints. The intuition is similar to
the one that is behind the existence of multiple margins in this economy.
International credit risk has two effects on contracting: on the zero profit
interest rate that is charged by banks, and on the returns on the outside
option that is faced by entrepreneurs. Since entrepreneurs need to complete
the investment of 1, they will either be paying an interest rate for whatever
capital they borrow, or foregoing the interest rate that they would earn on
the capital that they already have. Hence, the amount of capital that they
have does not amplify the effect of the increase in risk. On the other hand
if the entrepreneur contracts on effort and then shirks, the interest rate on
the outside option and the opportunity cost are different. Moreover, since
the benefits of shirking dilute away as k -- 1, so will the effect of this wage
and, hence, the effect of risk on the ICH constraint.
The amplification of domestic productivity risk (v,) will have a smaller
effect on EU(l,h) than on EU(h,h), for the marginal firm, since it is amplified
by the technological success probability that is actually chosen. Hence, again
the ICH will contract, in this case, amplified by productivity 7r, so it's slope
will increase.
In Figure 1.8 we put together the effects on the three types of constraints
for two types of economy. The top three panels show the effects on a dual
margin economy such as the one we presented in panel (b) of Figure 1.3,
the bottom three panels show the effects on a triple margin economy such
as that of panel (a) of Figure 1.3. It is important to note that the effects
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Figure 1.8: Effects of Risk Amplification
of heterogeneous k or 7r on the amplification of shocks is, in this case, cir-
cumscribed to the ICH constraint since we are asuming an economy with
no taxes or distortions that make the participation constraint slopes, such
as those studied in the last subsections of section 2.
As we can see, the effect of a domestic institutional risk amplification
is identical to that of a international credit risk amplification (panels a.a,
a.c, b.a and b.c of Figure 1.8). In both cases, the effect is concentrated
on the participation constrained margin composed of low productivity yet
relatively wealthy entrepreneurs. This is especially true in the dual margin
economy, where the effect on poorer and higher productivity entrepreneurs
is circumscribed to the tightening of the ICH constraint. We prove in the
C that the contraction of ICH will be less than the contraction of PCH for
any level of k. There is a powerful intuition behind this result and it is
the following: the ICH curve is the result of comparing two projects inside
the economy, the PCH curve, on the other hand is the result of comparing
a project within the economy with a project outside of it. In the case of
the domestic productivity shock it is very clear why it makes the domestic
economy relatively more risky than the outside option, and hence tightens
the PCH constraint more. In the case of the international credit risk it also
ends up making the domestic economy more risky. ,Why? Well, because
entrepreneurs that invest inside the economy will save interest rate payments
on the amount of k, while if they stay outside they will receive payments
for k. It makes no difference. LWhat changes? Well, if they stay inside the
economy, the international credit risk becomes risk on the margin that they
keep on the productivity of their borrowed capital
In the case of the triple margin economy this changes slightly since we
now have to add the effect of the tightening of the ICL constraint on the Tier
2 firms. Now, part of the highest productivity IC constrained firms suffer
only an interest rate increase (light shaded areas). Still the effect on richer
entrepreneurs is greater in the case of an amplification of domestic produc-
tivity risk v, because, as shown in C, the contraction of the PCH constraint
is larger than that of the PCL constraint. In the case, of international credit
risk, they are the same.
Consider the amplification of domestic institutional risk vc, that is, un-
certainty on the cost of shirking. In this case, as shown in C, the ICH
constraint will tighten less than PCH. The intuition, as above, is that the
PCH compares the project inside the economy with one outside, while the
ICH compares two projects inside. An amplification of the risks involved in
being inside the economy will affect more entrepreneurs that are participa-
tion constrained.
This general intuition behind this section has two implications. First,
riskier economies will be predominantly drained of wealthy, but relatively
low quality entrepreneurs. Second, average interest rates charged to these
economies will, naturally, increase, but will not across the whole economy,
but rather across the incentive constrained margin of poorer and productive
entrepreneurs.
Finally, it must be pointed out that in this economy all entrepreneurs
have the same residual risk aversion as far as the model is concerned. In
reality, it might be the case that richer entrepreneurs have several projects,
that they are able to hedge against each other, while poorer entrepreneurs
only have one. In the extreme, a rich entrepreneur, could own a continuum of
projects and face no risk at all. This could make the effects of this economy
less realistic.
1.7.2 Size
In this section we outline a model of an identical economy to which we add
an additional source of heterogeneity: size, understood as the scale of the
project relative to the capital owned by the entrepreneur. It's interesting to
understand how the size of the projects would enter into our model since, as
we have shown in subsection 1.1, most empirical evidence on heterogenous
reactions to shocks is constructed using size as a proxy of firm fragility (even
most of our own). The model of this paper, up to now, does not consider
heterogeneity in size. Moreover, all projects required an investment of 1, but
had different returns. In this section we will show that including this source
of heterogeneity, maintains the characteristics of the model and generates
an economy in which size is correlated with fragility on the margin.
The model can be adapted with great ease. Up to this point all projects
return 7rW as a result of an investment of 1. Now, we will assume that
all projects will return q7rW as a result of an investment of 0 < q 5 1, so
this parameter will be our indicator of both the scale of a project and the
required investment. Before writing out the program to be solved in charac-
terizing the contracts that will finance each project, we must note a nuance
of this section: that in this economy there will be an area of entrepreneurs
that will not require external finance to execute their projects. That is, all
entrepreneurs for which ¢ _ k will finance their projects directly and even
invest their remaining capital in their outside option k. The constraints will,
therefore, be relevant for the space of entrepreneurs that do not have enough
capital to finance their projects on their own.
Now we must redefine A = {{H, L, O, S} } C R33 the set of all possible
partitions of space B = [0, 1] x [0, 1] x [0, 1] such that HULUOnS = B and
H n L n 0 n S = 0. Sets H, L 0 and S describe collections of entrepreneurs
described by a pair (ir, k). H is the set of entrepreneurs that are financed
to execute their project with a high level of effort, a set of firms that we
will call Tier 1 from now on. L, is the set of entrepreneurs that are financed
to execute their project with a low level of effort, and we will call Tier 2
henceforth, set 0, is the set of entrepreneurs that decide to invest outside
the economy, and finally, set S is the set of entrepreneurs for which <5 k,
that are able to invest in the project without external finance. Call R =
(Rh, R 1) E R2 a vector describing the interest rate structure of this economy.
Equilibrium in this economy is described by (P, R) E A x R2 such that all
entrepreneurs maximize their expected profits and banks comply with the
zero profit free entry condition.
The entrepreneurs problem is modified slightly from (1.7), it is now to
maximize:
U(s, z) = p8 (4rW - (4 - k)rp ) - kr - c - qf(z, s) (1.19)
if ¢ < k. The maximization is done by choosing actual effort s E {h, l} and
promised effort z E {h, l}. To be as general as possible we will assume that
the cost of effort is proportional to the size of the project {ch, c1} = {cO, 0}
and also, that the fine (of enforced) is proportional to the size of the project,
although this is maybe less intuitive.
4 fo if z s (1.20)
0 ifz = s
and we are already assuming in equation (1.19) that banks will lend so that
the zero profit condition (1.3) is satisfied for every penny lent. If, on the
other hand ¢ > k, the entrepreneur will always execute the project as long
as OW > r, or otherwise will simply invest abroad. 6
The new thresholds will be
6In our model internal funds are always cheaper than external funds. The cost of
internal funds is r while the cost of external funds is rp- 1 depending on what level of
effort s was promised.
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and it is especially important to note that size does not affect any of the
participation constraints resulting from the model. The reason is that the
participation constraints result from the comparison of the use of capital
inside and outside of the economy. The scale of the project on the other
hand has to be dealt with using credit, and hence is constrained by incentive
problems. In the case of the ICH constraint scale is critical, since a larger
project will increase the return from effort, and hence make promises more
credible.
Figure 1.9 shows a slice of the partition at size phi. In addition to the
areas with the two tiers of firms and the area of entrepreneurs that are not
able to finance the project, there is now an area of entrepreneurs (lightest
shade) that are able to self finance their projects.
If we assumed the cost of effort and fines not to be proportional to the
size of the project, Figure 1.9 would not change very much (although it's
comparative statics will). If {ch,c1} = {c, 0} and also, the fine of equation
(1.20) is back to
f (z, S)= fO if Z (1.22)0 if z = s
then, the constraints become
(1 - k-l')rph' + (c - fq)0-1(ph - pl) - 'Trich = (1.23)W
(r + cq-l)ph1
7rpch - W
W
-1
= rp 1
and the PCH becomes sensitive to size since effort acts as a fixed cost that
is being compared to a benefit that is proportional to size. On the other
hand PCL remains insensitive to size. For robustness, we will analyze both
cases.
In Figure 1.10 we show the change in the constraints for two sizes Oh 2
I1. The top panels illustrate the effects on the two tier economy of panel
(b) in Figure 1.3, and the bottom two panels illustrate the effects on the
three tier economy of panel (a) in Figure 1.3 Panels (a.a) and (b.a) show the
case of equation array (1.21) with total proportionality to size in the costs of
effort and fines. Panels (a.b) and (b.b), on the other hand, shows the case of
equation array (1.23) where there is no such proportionality. In all cases, the
increase in size of the project has the trivial effect of leaving out a group of
marginal low productivity projects owned by wealthy entrepreneurs. They
are not eligible for contracting and they cannot finance this size of project,
so they will be investing abroad.
When effort costs and fines are proportional to size, the only effect of
size will be that the ICH constraint will tighten for larger projects. As
the size of the project increases, it becomes less and less credible for the
entrepreneur to pledge effort, since, the moral hazard problem becomes more
and more important. The entrepreneur's capital is a lower proportion of the
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investment and enforcing effort is more and more difficult. Moreover, this
effect of size is more important when capital is the main source of incentive
compatibility (larger k) and less when productivity is the source of incentive
compatibility (larger 7r) since productivity will be high for the whole project
no matter it's size. Hence, the ICH constraint become more elastic for slices
of B at higher sizes ¢. In this case, then, less projects are financed at higher
scales, and the entrepreneurs that loose credit to scale are mostly poor and
own highly productive projects. In the case of the triple margin (panel
b.a.) an important portion of these entrepreneurs will be offered credit at
Tier 2 interest rates. Hence, in this economy we should not expect size to
be correlated with either productivity or wealth, and moreover, we should
expect size to be correlated with higher interest rates. All of which is, of
course, not realistic.
When effort costs and fines are not totally proportional to size,. the model
starts giving more realistic stylized predictions. Two thing change. First,
the PCH curve is now relaxed by the growing scale of projects. The reason
is that the cost of effort starts to act as a fixed cost that is diluted with
size. Secondly, the ICH constraint pivots around a fixed point k (see C
for proofs) as the amplification of moral hazard that we described in the
previous paragraph due to the decreasing of the proportion of investment
financed by the entrepreneur interacts with another effect. In this case moral
hazard is loosened due to the dilution of the cost of effort. Hence, for poorer
entrepreneurs that rely on productivity to commit credibly to effort, the
ICH constraint will relax. On the other hand, less productive IC constrained
marginal entrepreneurs, that rely on their wealth to overcome moral hazard,
the ICH constraint will tighten. Fortunately for them we can prove (see
C) that all of the entrepreneurs for which the ICH constraint tightens will
be in fact participation constrained, and since the PCH constraint relaxes,
they will, in fact be benefited by size. Hence, in this other economy we
should expect size to be correlated with both higher average productivity,
less financial constraints (just like Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) assumed)
and lower interest rates. But it is important to note that we rely on a non
proportionality of effort and fines, hence, in the end, on a fixed cost.
One interesting question that one could ask is the following: are the
heterogeneous effect of shocks that we document in subsections 2.5-2.7, in-
creased or decreased in intensity by size? Or, in other words, we have already
shown that productive firms owned by financially dependent entrepreneurs
are relatively more sensitive to shocks. Will they also be more sensitive if
they are small? For a sufficiently clear answer we will focus on the dual
Table 1.1: Summary of Effects of International Shocks
Constraint ICH PCH PCL
W falls i = W = W-
-1 -1
r increases 7ic (1-k -l)phl i - 'p 7ichOr W Or W Or W
margin economy (because it has the simplest geometry), and on the inter-
national shocks of subsection 2.7, although the conclusions are generalizable
to all shocks of section 2. Also, we will constraint ourselves to an economy
with non proportional costs of effort and fines which is described by equa-
tion array (1.23), since it has delivered the most realistic stylized predictions.
The partial derivatives of these constraints with respect to adverse shocks
to gross productivity W (that we use to represent the world economy) and
the international interest rate r are:
In panels (a.b) and (b.b) of Figure 1.7 we have illustrated how the ICH
constraint will be looser for poor but productive entrepreneurs if the scale
of their projects is large. We can infer from Table 3.2.1 that the effect
of a world recession will also be smaller (since 7rich is lower). So, these
entrepreneurs will be relatively insulated by their scale from the effect of
the global recession on moral hazard. In fact, this will also be true for
participation constrained entrepreneurs on the PCH margin, since, as we
have shown above, the PCH will also be more relaxed for large firms. In
contrast, the effect of the interest rate shock on the PCH and PCL is the
same for all sizes. On the other hand, the effect on the ICH constraint is
smaller again since:
2 7ich kp[
r• = - W- (1.24)
In summary we find that it is consistent with this model, to use size as
a proxy for productivity or financial access as the literature has. Also, we
find that scale will help to ameliorate the heterogeneous effects of different
shocks.
1.8 Conclusion
The chapter starts by documenting how smaller and more financially de-
pendent firms have higher churning and higher volatility in creation and
destructions rate in Chile. This is done using two entirely new databases
that allow us to construct stylized facts from the job flow side and the firm
creation and destruction side.
We have studied a model of an economy with heterogeneous entrepre-
neurs in productivity, wealth and also size. e have shown that in such an
economy, with contracting originating from a hidden action problem, there
will be at least a dual margin with high productivity firms owned by poor
entrepreneurs being incentive constrained and low productivity firms owned
by richer entrepreneurs being participation constrained. The constraint will
be tighter for poorer and more productive entrepreneurs. We have shown
that this setup can also lead to an economy with multiple margins and dif-
ferential interest rates in contracts. Again, poorer entrepreneurs will be the
ones to face the higher interest rates.
We show that this participation constrained margin composed of poorer
but productive entrepreneurs will be more sensitive to shocks in this econ-
omy, more benefited by institutional improvements to contracting, financial
opening, financial development and the provision of technical support by
the government. This can help explain why in a developed country such as
Chile, small firms and financially dependent firms tend to be more volatile
and generally sensitive to shocks.
We show that these differences in sensitivity effects are amplified for
smaller scale projects and that it does seem reasonable to use size as a proxy
for fragility in a model such as the one presented in this paper. Finally, we
show that risk generally affects more the participation constrained margin
composed of wealthier entrepreneurs that will flee. We also show that in
riskier economies interest rates will be higher among poor entrepreneurs
with relatively high productivity.
Chapter 2
Fragility in Chile: The Firm
Side
2.1 Introduction
The ideal data set required to test the implications of the model we present
in Chapter 1 would contain data both on the quality of the entrepreneurial
project, it's financial conditions and the total wealth and financial resources
of the entrepreneurs or their households. Ignoring the financial structure of
the household that owns a small firm is a significant problem. Some indirect
proof of this can be found in Berkowitz and White (2004). They show that
firms that can credibly pledge homestead resources (because they are located
in states without limits on the event of bankruptcy) are 25% less likely to be
denied credit. This comes to show how relevant it is, when studying small
firms, to consider the assets and financial structure of households behind
them. If homestead financial resources are relevant for banks, they must
be relevant for regressions. At most there are proxies of the productivity
of projects' and of the financial resources of entrepreneurs (size is most
people's favorite).
'For example Galindo and Weiss (2005) use a sales to capital ratio and an operating
profits to capital ratio for publicly traded firms to show that financial liberalizations in
emerging markets have improved the efficiency of credit allocation.
One of the crucial database problems that this literature has is censor-
ship. When entrepreneurs are surveyed it is not usual for the methodol-
ogy to include households or individuals that do not engage in enterprises.
An ideal data set should control households that decide or are forced by
circumstance not to execute their entrepreneurial ideas or do not invest
time in developing them. Unfortunately such data sets are not easy to
come by. The closest to this ideal data set is the Thai and Indian survey
projects implemented by Bob Townsend of the University of Chicago, as
well as his Chicago Ethnic Neighborhood project.2 In these cases there are
comprehensive surveys of households that own micro and small enterprises.
Through very comprehensive (and expensive) surveying, Townsend is able
to penetrate the curtain between the finances of the firm and the house-
hold. On the other hand, his surveys purposefully emphasize very fragile
sectors with salient and significant cultural and idiosyncratic characteris-
tics. In any case, these surveys have enabled Paulson and Townsend (2004)
to show empirically, the expected result that (in Thailand) wealthier house-
hold are more likely to set up businesses and less likely to face financial
constraints. Paulson and Townsend (2005) use these databases to show the
slightly Schumpeterian result that the Thai 1998 crisis generated an increase
in entrepreneurship, particularly among poorer households.
The advantage of the FUNDES-SII database that we use in this chapter
(apart from its size and representativeness) is that it has some (very coarse)
financial variables of the firm. But still, we have total debt, assets and
sales, which, as we will explain allow us to locate the firms into the space
we used in the model of Chapter 1. Its main disadvantage is that it has no
information on the entrepreneur, his endowment, his household or the labor
he employs. On the other hand, we will take advantage of it's size to deal
with the censorship problem we discussed in the previous paragraph. In
this chapter we use another entirely new database for Chile which has just
been constructed in a joint project by FUNDES and the Internal Revenue
Service, with the objective of studying firm dynamics in Chile. 3
The Chapter is organized in the following way: Section 2.2 presents the
2For more information on these projects and papers that have used the resulting data-
bases see Bob Townsend's website at http://www.src.uchicago.edu/users/robt/.
3A similar panel has been constructed and used by Crespi (2003) for the FUNDES
project. But this is the first time it is used in such extension as a panel and subjected to
extensive econometric analysis. Also Crespi (2003) comprises the 1990-1998 period while
we use the 1999-2004 period. It is unfortunate that procedure changes in the Chilean
IRS (SII) make the two databases incompatible. It is also unfortunate that the fault line
occurs simoultaneously with the mayor crisis of the 90s decade: the Asian Crisis.
data, it's origins, advantages and limitations, and presents some basic styl-
ized facts on firm flows for Chile. Section 2.3 presents our main empirical
findings on creation, destruction and performance of Chilean firms. Sec-
tion 2.4 presents our main empirical findings on heterogenous reactions to
shocks. We end with the conclusions in Section 2.6. Also Appendices A.2
and D contain detailed descriptions of the data and extended results that
correspond to this chapter.
2.2 Creation, Destruction and Performance
2.2.1 The Data Set
The FUNDES-SII data set compiles information for all the firms that have
made their tax statement in Chile for the years 1999-2004. It contains
information on the economic sector of the firm, it's sales, value of assets, total
debt and profits. The database contains observations for roughly 650-700
thousand firms per year with fictitious identities. The complete database as
an unbalanced panel contains 4.1 million observations, making it by far the
most representative database for the Chilean economy. We use this database
to construct propensities for creation and destruction among different types
of firms, as well as improvement or worsening of sales performance among
surviving firms. All firm flows presented in this section are normalized with
respect to the average performance of the sector they belong to.4 In the
next sections of this chapter we run regressions where we properly identify
sector effects.
There are several problems that the database presents that make the
interpretation of its results complicated. First, these are legal rather than
economic definitions of firms. There are plenty of firms in Chile that have
several identities for accounting and tax purposes. We have no way of ac-
counting for these "hidden" larger firms. Second, we do not know that firms
that fall out or step into the panel are actually being created or destroyed.
We only know that they are not declaring taxes, hence, they could be step-
ping in and out of informality. In the job flow database of Chapter 3, for
4Specifically, we calculate a flows and performances by characteristic, sector and year.
Then we aggregate deviations from sector averages and finally weigh them according to
the importance o different sectors. on average in the FUNDES IRS database, 10% of firms
are from the agricultural sector, 0.6% are from forestry, 0.5% are from fishing, 0.2% are
mining (but they are very large), 6% are manufacturing, 0.3% are utilities (also large),
5% are construction, 37% are commerce and 41% are services.
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Figure 2.1: Firm Performance in Chile
example, this makes no difference at all since it is the surveyed worker that
subjectively classifies the workplace as a dependent job or not. Hence, its
very likely that we are, in this chapter, forced to ignore a large section of
micro and informal firms that could end up accounting for a large proportion
of entrepreneurial fragility in Chile.
2.2.2 The Stylized Facts
One of the first clues that the sample of firms in this dataset is different
comes from the panel of Figure 2.1. Here we show the percentage of firms
destroyed and created every year in this panel of firms. The numbers are
much smaller than what can be inferred from the database of Chapter 3.
Annual churning of firms seems to be in the 2%-4% range, as we have men-
tioned above it is entirely possible that the more fragile firms are, in fact,
labor intensive and hence the result of high job churning due to bankruptcy
that we found in the previous section. A second interesting feature of this
period is that it is one of post Asian Crisis net firm destruction. The ex-
ception is 2001 (indicating flows from 2000 to 2001, hence it is pre 9/11)
when creation was higher. In Figure 3.1 we can see that this coincides with
a period of relatively high growth (unfortunately we do not have data for
the relatively rapid growing year of 2005). The spike in firm destruction in
2003 is somewhat suspicious in the sense that it could indicate changes in
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registry of firms. As we will see in the sections that follow, this will not
change our results and, in fact, the econometric results for 2003 are robustly
in line with those for the rest of the sample. The second panel of Figure 2.1
counts the number of firms that having survived, either improved, worsened
or maintained their sales levels during a given year. interestingly enough,
with the exception of 2000, most surviving firms are improving their sales
levels (in real terms).
Before running any regressions that control for sector specific effects, we
calculate firm performance by size, only this time size is defined according
to sales levels. The FUNDES-SII database provides us with seven categories
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that we aggregate into four familiar categories: micro, small, medium and
large.5 Figure 2.2 shows firms performance by firm size. We can see that,
with the exception of the 2003 destruction spike, there is a clear difference
in the firm churning rates of micro firms and the rest. around 4% of micro
firms are destroyed and crated, while only around 1% are destroyed and
created among the other categories. It is also more likely for larger firms to
improve their sales, although this result is less robust and is not observed
in 2003 and 2004. On the other hand it is very unlikely for micro firms that
survive to worsen their sales level. This could be a very strong indicator
of the fragility of these firms: either they improve and maintain their sales
levels or they fall into bankruptcy or informality. As an interesting feature,
from the "small" category onwards, the probability of worsening falls with
size for 2000-2002.
For Figure 2.3 we have divided the databases according to "financial
dependency" defined as total debt over total assets. That is, the extent to
which the entrepreneur is actually working with someone else's capital to
financie his enterprise or 1 - k in the notation of Chapter 1. However, it is
important to consider that, in the model below k includes all the assets and
financial resources of the entrepreneur's household. Whilst in this database
we only see the assets and debt of the firm. Even if the household's assets
are not formally associated or mortgaged, a bank will obviously feel more
reassured if the entrepreneur has other sources of liquidity that can sustain a
business through rough times. Hence, there is a chance that we may confuse
financial dependency with access to credit markets, and, as we shall see in
the next sections of this Chapter this is in fact a crucial distinction. In any
case, in this section we divide the database into four quartiles, where the
first quartile is composed of firms with the least financial dependency. 6
The evidence is that firm churning is higher among more financially
5The "official" definition of sizes in Chile (relevant for policy indicators mostly) is
the following: micro firms have annual sales up to 2,400 Unidades de Fomento (UF, the
Chilean official inflation index) which is just bellow US$ 80,000; small firms are those in
the 2,400-25,000 UF range which is up to just over US$ 800,000; medium firms are those
with annual sales in the 25,000-100,000 UF range which is just over US$ 3 million; and
over this benchmark a firm is considered large. Accordin to this database, the Chilean
economy has arround 550,000 micro firms, 100,000 small firms, 15,000 medium firms and
7,000 large firms.
6 One interesting feature of the FUNDES IFS database is the enormous number of firms
with negative equity when comparing assets and debt. Tax accountants will explain that
the value of assets that is recorded for many firms is constrained by legal definitions and
book values, while the value of debts is priced in the market. It is frequent, hence, for the
firms in this database to have large debt to asset ratios.
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Figure 2.4: Firm Performance and Cash Flows
dependent firms. We find particularly interesting, the concentration of firm
destruction among micro firms. Among the fourth quartile firm destruction
is roughly 9% per year, while it fluctuates around 3% for firms in the first
quartile. This partition of the database is less meaningful when analyzing
sales performance among surviving firms. there is no clear pattern for sales
improvement, but there is a seemingly paradoxical trend towards a lower
proportion of financially dependent firms to worsen their sales. Again, this
is probably a sign that, among surviving firms, our measure of financial
dependence is really capturing credit market access to some extent.
Finally, we divide the database into quartiles according to the most
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common productivity indicator in this literature, which is cash flow (sales)
over asset value. 7 Figure 2.4 displays the results. In this case, quartile 1
is comprised by firms with the lowest cash flows and quartile 4 by firms
with the highest cash flows. The evidence is that destruction and creation
is particularly high among first quartile firms. Destruction is exceptionally
low among third and fourth quartile firms. Among surviving firms, on the
other hand, there seems to be some evidence of a high percentage of firms
that maintain their sales level (one minus the percentages in the two lower
panels of figure 2.4), but particularly strong evidence of very little firms
that worsen. Again, these fragile firms seem to have much more dramatic
outcomes.
2.3 Heterogeneity and Small Firms
In this section we will attempt to estimate the determinants of destruction,
creation and performance of entrepreneurial projects using the FUNDES-
SII database for Chile. The model we are estimating is a reduced form of
the model presented in the first chapter of this dissertation, but there are
some additional assumptions that we must make in order to take the model
literally and proceed towards estimations.
The main result of the model of Chapter 1 is summarized in Figure 2.5
where we represent a country or sector constituted by firms that have three
types of heterogeneity: financial dependency 0 < k < 1 (the proportion
of their capital that is financed externally), productivity 0 < ?r < 1 (the
capability they have of extracting value added from the economy), and scale
or size 0 < ¢ < 1. The economy has a continuum of entrepreneurial projects
that are distributed on this space in some way (in the model of Chapter 1 we
have assumed a homogeneous distribution), and occupies the area comprised
by space B = [0, 1] x [0, 1] x [0, 1]. A hidden information problem makes
it possible only for a subset of firms to sign contracts were they credibly
promise to exert unobservable effort. Generally, this partitions B into an
area of entrepreneurial projects that are financed and another that is not.8
7See previous footnote. Again cash flow is valued at market prices and is a crucial
input for the IRS to calculate the firms tax liabilities. Assets, on the other hand, have
book values, giving us some pretty wild cash flow indicators. Since all we do is in this
section is rank them, this should not be a major problem.
8In the complete model there is also the possibility that some firms are profitable even
if they do not promise high effort. In this case these firms are financed but are charged
higher interest rates. In the database we use in this chapter there is no information on
the interest rates being payed by the firms so we will simply ignore this possibility and
Panel (b) of Figure 2.5 shows the margin of such an economy constituted
by the upper envelope of two types of constraints: a participation constraint
that will be active for relatively less productive firms that use mainly internal
finance, and an incentive compatibility constraint that will be active for
relatively more productive firms that use external finance intensely. All
firms above the envelope will be financed, all firms bellow the envelope will
not. In panel (a) of figure 2.5 we show a slice of space B at a certain size. In
Chapter 1 of this dissertation we prove that, as size increases, the constraints
are relaxed, particularly the incentive constrained margin, hence the slant
in the margin as size € increases.
In this chapter we will assume that it is feasible to represent the whole
of the model of Chapter 1 in an instrumental function E(7r, k, ¢) that we
will call eligibility. We will assume that E(1, 1, 1) = +oo, E(0, 0,0) = -00oo
and E(7*, k*, 0*) = 0 such that firm {1r*,k*,¢*} is a firm on the margin.
Function E(.) will be some measure of distance from the margin that we
do not know, although we know the arguments of the function, and the
model where it comes from. Critically for our estimation we cannot observe
E(.) only it's arguments and wether it is greater or smaller than zero at
any moment in time. In Figure 2.5 we illustrate a position for a sample
firm. Function E(.) will be some measure of distance from the margins that
properly represents the model of Chapter 1.
The second relevant result that we must rescue from Chapter 1 is the
fact that the incentive constrained margin will be more sensitive to a vari-
ety of shocks. Figure 2.6 illustrates a generic adverse shock to this economy.
The effect is to make non viable a set of firms that is close to the margins.
However, the model shows that this shock will have larger effects on smaller
firms (lower ¢), less productive firms (lower 7r) and more financially depen-
dent firms (larger k), although most of the destruction will be concentrated
among relatively productive firms owned by financially dependent entrepre-
neurs. In the following sections of this chapter we will attempt to estimate
which characteristics of these firms increase the sensitivity of eligibility E(.)
to external conditions.
One of the many insufficiencies of the model in Chapter 1 is that it is
a static model. Entrepreneurs have a single project that is either financed
or not. The concept of fragility that we use in that chapter is particular
to the characteristics of the model. We say that entrepreneurs are fragile
if it is very likely that a shock can devoid them from external finance that
they would have otherwise secured. To be more realistic, firms in this model
stick to the dual margin model with only one Tier of firms being financed.
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should really be a succession of static entrepreneurial projects. A shock may
interrupt the operation of a fragile firm for a period driving it back in it's
process of accumulation of capital or driving it into bankruptcy. In this
sense, the model is really one of creation and destruction of static projects,
rather than firms.
It turns out that this fits rather well with the nature of the database we
are using since it is constructed from reports to the Chilean Internal Revenue
Service. The rule at the Chilean IRS is that the firms RUT identification
number (Unique Tax Registry or Registro Unico Tributario) is dropped from
the database when it does not file tax forms for a third consecutive year.
It is possible that firms do not have activities for a year (for example due
to restructuring) and cease to produce. It is also possible that they have
simply disappeared and actually been destroyed as firms. Since our panel is
quite short it is not possible for us to determine which is the case. All we
can say is that it has not filed a report so that a particular year's project
has been destroyed, not the actual firm. We will use this concept of project
creation and destruction as an empirical approximation to entrepreneurial
creation and destruction in Chile.
2.3.1 Destruction
Call xi,t = {Ti, ki, Oi} the vector that characterizes the firms in this model. It
will be critical for our estimation to assume that this vector of characteristics
evolves dynamically in a way that can be approximated by some unknown
process:
xi,t = •xi,t-1 + ei,t-1 (2.1)
ei,t-1 = Ei,t-1 + T1t-1 + pi
that is shocked through time by an i.i.d. vector of shocks that are particular
to the firm (pi- 1 ), to the economy but particular to a moment in time (qt-1),
and particular to the firm at a moment in time (Ei,t-l)
We must assume that vector x is measured with error in our database.
In particular, we will observe a vector 2 such that
xi,t = xi,t + Vi (2.2)
where v is a a vector of i.i.d. noises. Since we are interested in destruction,
we will be interested in observing firms that disappear from the database.
That is, we will be interested in understanding the determinants of
Figure 2.7: Eligibility Function, Chosen Function and Approximation
P(Destruction) = P (E(xi,t) < O/E(xi,t-1) > 0) (2.3)
and although we will not be able to observe xi,t directly we know from 2.1
and 2.2 that
xi't = nxii,t-1 + (fi,t-1 + 77t-1 + Pi, - 7vi) (2.4)
so that, theoretically we can use an estimation Si,t = Tyi,t-1 to estimate the
probability of destruction of equation (2.3) if we knew y and the form and
parameters of the eligibility function E(.). However, we do not know the
parameter. We do observe the outcome function F(.) that summarizes E(.)
by reporting who is chosen and who is not chosen to execute their project,
given by
( 1 if E(xi,t) (2.5)
Fi,t = 0 if E(xi,t) < 0
which we can see compared to E(.) in Figure 2.7. In this paper we shall
attempt to estimate E(.) by adjusting a function (. The usual choice is to
use the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal density for
(D which yields the probit model or the lognormal distribution yielding the
logit model.
Table 2.1: Preferred Probit Regressions: Probability of Destruction
full panel 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
7r -6.13% -5.53% -7.09% -6.56% -5.65% -6.07%
(0.08%)*** (0.18%)*** (0.20%)*** (0.21%)*** (0.18%)*** (0.18%)***
1 - k -0.00% 0.29% -0.28% 0.10% 0.13% -0.12%
(0.06%) (0.12%)** (0.13%)** (0.15%) (0.13%) (0.12%)
-2.23% -2.02% -2.67% -2.33% -2.02% -2.20%
(0.01%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)***
Obs. 938,561 206,727 174,049 189,510 191,384 176,895
LogPLike -199066.85 -41440.224 -37193.162 -42660.072 -39368.965 -38050.662
Pseudo R2 0.2095 0.2099 0.2464 0.2026 0.2018 0.1910
I
Note 1: Marginal effects on the probability of destruction, standard errors in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance, ** is 95% significance,*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Dummy for micro firms, Dsz(micro) has been dropped.
The equation of our preferred probit regression is:
P(Destruction)t,i = F (foT + ciirt,i + a2(1 - kt,i) + 33 DSci + 34DSzi)
(2.6)
Where ir, our measure of productivity of the firm, will be the cotangent of
the ratio of profits to total assets.9 Our measure of k will be the ratio of
equity over assets, so that we will call 1 - k "financial dependency" and
measure it by the ratio of credit to assets. Finally we include a set of time
dummies T, a set of sector dummies DSc and a set of size dummies Dsz.10
The results are presented in Table 2.1. The Table presents the marginal
effects of 7r and 1 - k, and the marginal effects of each of the size dummies
Dsz. The table with the complete results (sector dummy marginal effects
and year dummy marginal effect for the full panel regression) is available in
Appendix D.
The table shows the probit regression for the full panel and also for five
sets of consecutive years. A few things are worth noticing The first is that
the marginal effect of productivity ir is always negative (better quality firms
have a lower probability of disappearing) and statistically relevant at the
highest significance level. Second, the estimated marginal effect of produc-
tivity is very robust, with the exception of the first couple of years when
profitability seems to have taken a back seat. Secondly, the size dummies
are always significant at the highest level, and indicate that there is always
9Cotangent is defined for (-oo, +oo) but is bounded so it helps to limit the effect of
outliers on the regression
10Where we have classified sizes in the way that is customary in Chilean public policies
and is used in subsection 2.2.
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Figure 2.8: Marginal Effect of 1 - k on the probability of default
a smaller chance of survival for firms that are larger than what we classify
as micro firms (excluded dummy). And finally, it is interesting to see that
the marginal effect of financial dependency 1 - k is not very significative,
if anything it shows a 10% significance level for the 2000-2001 pair. Given
this result we should reject that financial dependency or leverage, at least
in the way we are measuring it is an important variable in our model and
prima facie we should cast doubt on the model of Chapter 1.
However, and this is the main finding of this section, we know from the
stylized facts of the previous section that the regressions of Table 2.1 hide
a some meaningful heterogeneity. To illustrate this instead of artificially
dividing the sample into the size categories we have used up to this point,
we decide to divide the sample according to a criteria that imposes less
structure on the regression and attributes less meaning to the particular
thresholds that are used in Chilean development policies. We rank the full
panel and order the observations according to size measured as the log of
sales in real terms and then run probit regressions for a rolling sample of
centiles starting from the smallest firms and moving to the largest.
Figure 2.8 reports the estimated marginal effect of 1 - k for deciles of
different sizes. As we can see, for smaller firms, the effect is positive and
significant while for larger firms it becomes negative and significant. This
means that for smaller firms 1 - k acts as an indicator of "financial fragility"
or "financial constraint" while for larger firms it is more of an indicator
of financial access. This, in our view, is consistent with the prediction of
Chapter 1 that the scale of entrepreneurial projects helps relax the incentive
constrained margin composed of very productive and poor entrepreneurs:
scale helps with the asymmetric information problem.Furthermore, Figure
D.1 in Appendix D sows the robustness of this result by running the same
program but separated by years in the same way that we used to checked for
robustness in Table 2.1. Of course, as samples are reduced, the significance
of the result is also hurt (so the confidence intervals are thicker) but the
form of the curve and the general conclusion is sustained.
2.3.2 Creation
Studying creation of firms in this database does not allow for a lot of well
specified econometrics since we do not have a control group. We do not
have data on what would have been the size, the financial dependency and
the productivity of entrepreneurial projects that were not implemented ei-
ther because of strategic decisions by the entrepreneurs or did not accede to
financing due to adverse evaluations in the banking sector. Hence we are,
by nature, restricted to a statistical description of the firms that are cre-
ated. Our solution is to calculate "propensities" to create among different
types of firms and then try to predict with econometrics these propensi-
ties. In a sense, this methodology is very similar to the construction of
pseudo panels that is frequent in labor and public finance econometrics.
What this literature does is to construct "fictitious" representative individ-
uals that can be observed through the population that they represent, even
if actual individuals cannot. Usually, these individuals are constructed by
grouping the observed samples according to some subset of demographic or
socio-economic characteristics. The assumption is that the characteristics
and collapsed data of this constructed representative individual would have
been the data if we had been able to actually find that individual, survey,
and follow him or her through time. Then these "fictitious" representative
individuals are used in panel regressions to address whatever question this
literature wants to ask.
Our methodology is very similar, what we do is expand on the three
dimensional decile grid that we have used in the previous section. In generic
terms, lets call the three dimensions {x, y, z}, and assume we rank in deciles
along each. To do this properly we must rank z decile within each y decile
and each x decile. The result is a homogenous grid of 1,000 partition cells
(10 x 10 x 10) with an identical amount of firms. We then collapse the
data in each partition to obtain stylized characteristics of the representative
firm of each partition cell. In particular, we count the number of firms
created in each cell, count the years and sectors that predominate in each
cell, estimate the average {ir, k, 0} that we assume to be the characteristics
of the representative firm and execute the following OLS regression:
Creation = al•rd + a 2 (1 - kd) + 03Od + 31VSc + - 2VYr (2.7)
Where Creation is the amount of firms created, rdis the productivity decile
of the cell, 1 - kd is the financial dependency decile and Od is the size decile,
VSc is a vector that counts the number of firms of each sector within each
partition cell and VYr is a vector that counts the relative importance of
observations of each year from the sample in the partition cell. Since each
cell has the same number of firms we interpret the parameter as incidences
of different characteristics of the "representative" firm of the partition cell.
Table 2.2 shows the results for the preferred regression as well as the
results for the same regression for each subsample of creation during two
consecutive years. The results indicate that, on average, creation of firms
is more likely among smaller, less productive firms that tend to borrow a
small proportion of their initial capital. We realize that this is not com-
pletely surprising, but it is important to remember, that most of the em-
pirical literature treats size as a good proxy for restricted access to capital
markets or even the quality of firm projects. This regression shows us that,
at the very least, size and financial access are operating through different
channels, and, hence, have their own significative effects. Moreover, even in
our regression, and following the sense of our discussion in subsection 2.3.1
the direct interpretation of 1 - k is not clear. We could argue that is is a
measure of financial dependency and hence fragility or a measure of financial
access. In this case, in our view, the variable is indicating financial access.
Finally the extended version of table 2.2 with the estimated parameters for
all the dummies can be found in Table D.2 of Appendix D. Also, the results
are extremely robust across different time spans, parameters continue to be
very significant but approach in level towards cero indicating some loss of
significance in the subsamples.
A crucial difference between the results in Table 2.2 and Table 2.1 is
the robust significance of the 1 - k parameter across all time span subsam-
ples. In the case of creation, it seems, 1 - k indicates financial access and
Table 2.2: Preferred Regressions: Amount of Creation
full panel 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
r -6.14 -1.05 -1.11 -1.10 -1.25 -1.21
(0.27)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
1 -- k -1.49 -0.41 -0.24 -0.46 -0.43 -0.49
(0.24)*** (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
-12.80 -2.24 -2.48 -2.12 -2.33 -1.94
(0.60)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.12)*** (0.13)*** (0.12)***
Obs. 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
LogLike -4305.75 -2987.63 -3070.15 -2976.80 -3000.91 -3005.87
R2 0.7739 0.5972 0.6092 0.6657 0.6479 0.6318
Note 1: Effect of increasing a decile on amount of creation, standard error in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance, ** is 95% significance, 5** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Dummy for micro firms, Dsz(micro) has been dropped.
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Figure 2.9: Parameter of 1 - k on creation
not financial dependency, like it did for smaller firms in Figure 2.8. So, in
this case, the most reasonable interpretation is that the parameter indicates
that controlling for everything else, it is most likely that new firms rely on
internal finance. In any case, motivated by the evidence of economically
significant heterogeneity that we found in section 2.3.1 we do a similar ex-
ploration into heterogeneity in this section. We rank all firms according to
size centile, and we then run preferred regression 2.6 and store the 1 - k
parameter and significance band for each rolling decile. The result can be
seen in Figure 2.9. As we can see the parameter is negative (with statistical
significance) across all size sub samples just as it was for every year. It is
interesting to note, though, that the absolute magnitude of the parameter
falls with size. For smaller firms, it seems, financial restrictions are much
more important determinants of the possibility if implementing a project.
Finally, it is interesting to note the geometric symmetry between figures 2.8
and 2.9. The marginal effect of financial dependency on default probability
is convex in the same way that the parameter on creation propensity is con-
cave. This means that the smallest sizes of firms in our data base that turn
out to be those for which a large 1 - k is not helpful in surviving crisis, are
the same for which financial access is especially stringent for creation.
2.3.3 Performance
In the two previous subsections we have addressed the determinants of cre-
ation and destruction of firms. In this subsection we will study the deter-
minants of performance measured as growth of the sales/assets ratio. Since
the model presented in Chapter 1 of this dissertation is not a model of
entrepreneurial performance but rather of entrepreneurial creation and de-
struction, it is important that we justify the relevance of this subsection for
the questions that we are asking in this dissertation.
One way to interpret the model in Chapter 1 is that it is a model of entre-
preneurial projects rather than a model of actual firms, with the exception,
of course, of smaller single project firms, among which both interpretations
are equivalent. Firms, under this interpretation, are intermediaries for en-
trepreneurs that work as staff inside them or units that have some level of
administrative independence. Hence, the entrepreneurial unit inside the firm
could face a similar information asymmetry and contracting problem as the
entrepreneur of our model. In this case, the performance of firms could serve
as an indicator of the success or failure of entrepreneurial projects within
existing firms. Hence, wWe will estimate the following OLS regression:
Table 2.3: Preferred Regressions: Sales Performance
full panel 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
3.38% 3.35% 3.38% 3.08% 3.34% 3.40%
(0.41%)*** (0.09%)*** (0.10%)*** (0.09%)*** (0.09%)*** (0.08%)***
1 - k 0.30% 0.26% 0.31% 0.29% 0.33% 0.38%
(0.22%)*** (0.04%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.04%)***
0.71% 0.76% 0.80% 0.71% 0.48% 0.86%
(0.00%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01)***
Obs. 862,798 192,249 159,782 174,075 174,119 162,573
LogLike 969933.25 219258.79 179237.31 196236.78 193210.28 182696.50
R2 0.0589 0.0667 0.0652 0.0585 0.0409 0.0786
I
Note 1: Effect of variable on sales growth, standard error in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance, ** is 95% significance,*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Dummy for micro firms, Dsz(micro) has been dropped.
Per f ormancet,i = /oT + alirt,i + a 2 (1 - kt,i) + a3st,i + 01DSci (2.8)
Where Performance is the percentage increase in the sales/assets ratio for
firm i in the year t, 7r is productivity, 1 - k is financial dependency and 0 is
size, DSc is the sector dummy vector, and T is the year dummy vector.
The results of the preferred performance regressions can be seen in Ta-
ble 2.3. The results are very robust across time and indicate that higher
productivity, higher financial dependence, and size are predictors of sales
performance. The extended regression with the estimated parameters for
all the dummies can be found in Appendix D. In this case, it seems that
1- k is indicating financial access, and that firms with more external financ-
ing seem more likely to implement successfully their entrepreneurial projects
and have good sales performances. Figure 2.10 shows the same heterogene-
ity exercise of Figures 2.8 and 2.9. Interestingly, for very small firms, the
sign of the 1 - k parameter is negative and very significative. It is very clear
that the signs in Table 2.3 are a result of the weigh of 8 deciles worth of
firms for which 1 - k is an indicator of financial access. However, it seems
very clear, just like it was for the destruction regressions of subsection 2.3.1
that for smaller firms it is really an indicator of financial dependency and
constraints.
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Figure 2.10: Parameter of 1 - k on performance
2.4 Heterogeneity and Sensitivity to Shocks
One clear cut conclusion that one can extract from section 2.3 is that there
is economically meaningful heterogeneity in the sensitivity of firm perfor-
mance, survival and creation to different parameters. In particular, it seems
that among the smallest firms, 1 - k is an indicator of financial constraint
rather than financial access. It seems, that among larger firms it is a good
thing to be working with "other people's money" while it is a bad thing
among smaller firms (although it could be inevitable). In this section we do
two things. We explore heterogeneity in a more multidimensional way and
we do so while testing for sensitivity to shocks.
Up to this point all that we have done is to predict financial behavior
through firm characteristics. The estimated parameters that accompany
1 - k, lr and € in the regressions are reduced form parameters that describe
the probability of different types of firms in general. It is important to
note that the regressions of tables 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 have sector and year
dummies that, presumably, are capturing the incidence of macroeconomic
and sector shocks faced by the firms of the Chilean economy. Hence, most of
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the information on the importance of shocks for different firms is contained
in the levels and statistical significance of the estimated vector of dummy
parameters.
One way of using these parameter vectors to estimate the importance of
macroeconomic and sectoral shocks on different types of firms is to execute
a Log Likelihood Ratio test on their statistical significance and to interpret
the size of the statistic as an indicator of the relative importance of these
shocks to different types of firms. Generically we estimate:
Xt,i = )oT + airt,i + C2 (1 - kt,i) + a3 t,i + 31DSci (2.9)
and extract the log likelihood statistic for the complete regression, which we
call 11,; then we estimate the restricted regression:
Xt,i = oa7rt,i + a2(1 - kt,i)+ C3Ot,i (2.10)
which is the same regression as 2.9 but without the year dummies (which we
hypothesize are capturing the macroeconomic shocks of this economy) and
the sector dummies (which capture the sector shocks). Again we extract the
the log likelihood statistic, which we call 11,. Finally we calculate:
LRT = -2(11, - 11,) - X(n) (2.11)
where n is the total number of restrictions imposed in regression 2.10, which
in this case is 14 (9 sectors and 5 year pairs). We estimate this statistic for
subsets of the firms, and generically find that the dummy vectors are always
statistically significant for all types of regressions (probits for destruction
and OLS regressions for creation and performance).
Constructing the grid for the Creation regressions was slightly more con-
voluted, since, as we can recall from subsection 2.3.2 the methodology was
already based on collapsing the database into a 10 x 10 x 10 grid of the whole
space of variables we are using. What we do is to restrict our attention to
the two dimensional space that we want to graph (for example the {k,}r)
space for the main result of this section). In each square of the grid we rank
the firms into thousandiles and run the regression ignoring the parameter
of the variable that we have used to rank and collapse the database of the
square we are working on (in this case size 4). Of course the problem is
that when we wish to repeat the exercise for a different space (as we do in
Appendix D), we need to recalculate completely the database on which we
run the regression. However, results are very robust, as we will illustrate in
Section 2.5 and Appendix D.
Figure 2.11 shows the LR test of equation 2.10 for a 10 x 10 grid on
the {k,i} space. Each row has a pair of graphs constituted by a three
dimensional surface and a contour graph with identical coloring. The first
row shows the tests for the destruction probits of equation 2.6, the second
row shows the test for the creation regressions of equation 2.7, and the third
row shows the test for the performance regressions of equation 2.8.
The first thing to note is the heterogeneity in the levels of the LR tests
for different types of firms. Destruction seems to peak in sensitivity along
a diagonal that runs from high k low 7r firms to low k high 7r firms. This
is also true in the performance regressions although the slope of the line
of peaks is lower and the line runs at much higher productivity levels than
for the destruction probits. It is interesting to note that this diagonal of
peak sensitivity is exactly what is predicted by the model of Chapter 1,
that is, the existence of sensitive margin of highly productive entrepreneurs
that are mostly financed with external resources. The second row, how-
ever, shows that peak sensitivity in creation is clearly among high k, low r
projects, that is, low productivity projects that have most of the resources
to be implemented but require some finance. There is some insinuation of a
diagonal in the creation contour, showing that there is a margin of increas-
ingly productive firm creation projects with lower internal resources that is
relatively sensitive to shocks, but it is less clear than among the destruction
and performance regressions.
The same types of graphs for 10 x 10 grids on the {f,7rl} and {1,k}
spaces can be found in Figures D.4 and D.5 of Appendix D respectively.
In them we find sensitivity peaks for small and low productivity firms in
creation (which is not surprising), but for mid productivity small firms in
destruction. interestingly we find a diagonal in the performance regressions
constituted by two peaks: a high productivity - small firm peak and a middle
productivity - large firm peak. We find that smaller firms are more sensitive
in destruction, larger firms are more sensitive in creation and large firms
with middle productivity are more sensitive in performance. 11
As an additional demonstration of the importance of heterogeneity we
show in Figures D.6 to D.14 of Appendix D the parameters for the 10 x 10
grids on the three spaces. For the financial parameter 1 - k we can see in
Figures D.7 and D.8 the same fact that we have documented in figures 2.8
to 2.10, that is that there is a sign change in the parameter for smaller firms
1 1The creation regressions for Figures D.4, D.7 and D.10 are different from those used
in Figures 2.11, D.6 and D.9. The first are run constructing thousandiles along k while
the former are run constructing thousandiles along ¢. Creation regressions of Figures D.5,
D.8 and D.11 are run constructing thousandiles along 7r.
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in the case of the destruction probit and the performance regression, that
the sign remains in the creation regression, but the parameter is stronger
for smaller firms. However, we also find some new things. For example in
figure D.7 we can see that there is an area of middle productivity firms with
relatively small capital that have very high absolute 1 - k parameters both
for destruction and performance. In the case of destruction, parameters are
positive, while they are negative in the case of performance. It would seem
that these firms are very financially constrained, and it is interesting that
they are in the lower middle squares of our grid. Another interesting hetero-
geneity can be found in the surfaces and contours of Figure D.13 where we
display the € size parameter. Again, destruction and performance show a
symmetry. Size enters as a negative parameter in destruction probits and as
a positive parameter in performance regressions. However, the peak para-
meters, in both cases can be found in the low capital low productivity areas
of the grid. On the other hand the size parameter peaks in the creation
regression among high capital low productivity firms. Hence, it seems that
size can be used as an attribute to substitute for deficits in other character-
istics of a project. It is basically substituting productivity in all three types
of regressions. However, for existing firms (to be destroyed or not) it is more
important among financially dependent firms, and for potential firms (to be
created or not) it is more important among high capital firms.
2.5 Who and Where are the Fragile Firms?
In this section we characterize the anonymous dummies that we have been
using in sections 2.3 and 2.4, and try to illustrate the sectors and geographic
distribution of our results on sensitivity to shocks. To do this, again, we es-
timate the LR tests on the dummy vectors from equation 2.11, only this
time instead of sorting the data base on grids we sort them according to
regions of the country and sectors. When we sort by sectors, of course, both
the complete and restricted models of each type of regression lack sector
dummies, so we only remove the year dummies as an indicator of macroeco-
nomic shocks. The nine sectors we have used are described in Table A.2.2
of Appendix A.2. The regions of Chile, on the other hand are fairly easy
to understand. They are numbered from I to XII in order from the arid
northernmost region (I) to the southern patagonian region (XII). The ex-
ception is the capital Santiago which is usually called Regidn Metropolitana
(Metropolitan Region) and is in the middle of the country between Region
V and VI. Region V (Valparaiso and Vifia del Mar) and VIII (Concepci6n
and Talcahuano) contain the other two major urban concentrations of the
country.
The first panel of Figure 2.12 shows the LR test for the different regions
of Chile. To facilitate graphical presentation we have normalized the LR
tests of the different regressions. Figure 2.12 presents is the ratio of the test
of a given region to the average test for the country.12 We present tests for
the destruction probit, performance regression and creation regressions on
the three dimensions (as explained in footnote 11) As we can see, by far, the
most sensitive region to macroeconomic shocks is Santiago. It is followed by
Regions V and VIII, and then Region X that also follows in urbanization.
The second panel shows us four characteristics of the regions: their par-
ticipation in value added, their participation in national population, their
participation in the number of firms in our database and finally, the average
of the relative LR tests of the first panel. As we can see sensitivity seems
to be clearly correlated with urbanization. Moreover, the only exception
is Region II where most of the largest capital intensive copper mines are.
There, per capital value added is much higher, but still relative LR tests are
at the level predicted by population and firm concentration. 13
The natural question is then: what is going on in urban areas that makes
them more sensitive? Section 2.4 insinuates part of the answer. Urban
regions must contain most of this sensitive margin that is shown in the
diagonal of Figure 2.11. In other words urban areas must contain most low
productivity high capital firms, most high productivity low capital firms
and most small firms. What sectors do these firms belong to? Figure 2.13
shows that it is mostly commerce and services that show large sensitivity
to shocks. These sectors are clearly urban. Moreover, they are followed by
construction and manufacturing which are also urban. Rural sectors like
agriculture and forestry are relatively stable. Interestingly, the construction
sector shows larger relative sensitivity in performance among existing firms
while services shows very little sensitivity in performance but very high
sensitivity in creation and destruction. In a nutshell: service sector firms
churn rapidly, construction firms improve or worsen but survive, commerce
does both. Also, although manufacturing (which is the sector used in most
of the literature due to data availability) is the fourth most volatile sector
in Chile.
12 For example on average Region V shows slightly higher tests than the average of the
country, Region RM shows tests that are 5 to 7 times the average of the country, and so
forth.
13One of the reasons we show the LR tests for creation regressions in the different
dimensions is to illustrate the robustness of the results across these different regressions.
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Figure 2.12: Relative LR Test for Shocks in Different Chilean Regions
As we explain in Appendix A.2, the nine sectors we use in the regressions
are really aggregations of the available sector descriptions in the database.
The reason we aggregate is to not consume the regressions in dummies and
to be able to graph effectively. However, one last exercise we do is to unfold
the 9 sectors into 42 subsectors and then run the LR sensitivity test for
all of them. In Table 2.4 we show the most sensitive and the less sensitive
subsectors for the destruction probit, the performance regression and the
creation regression on the 10 x 10 x 10 grid. We find that construction is
one of the most sensitive sectors, but also retail clothing, foods and home
improvement. On the other hand, among the less sensitive are some whole-
sale sectors, utilities, and less sumptuary retail like jewelry and furniture.
What the table seems to show is that sectors that depend more on consump-
tion demand are more sensitive to shocks, while sectors that depend more
on investment demand or inventories are less sensitive. This is curious since
investment demand is the more volatile component of aggregate demand.
It must be that, by nature, these suppliers are larger, more productive and
less financially dependent.
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Figure 2.13: Relative LR Test for Shocks in Different Sectors of the Chilean
Economy
Table 2.4: Subsector Sensitivity to Shock, Ranking of LR Tests
Most Volatile Less Volatile
Destruction
1 Construction 42 Other Manufactures
2 Retail, clothing 41 Retail, office and school supplies
3 State and Social Services 40 Wholesale, textiles, clothing and leather
4 Retail, home improvement 39 Retail, jewelry, watches and apparel
5 Other Activities 38 Fishing
6 Restaurants and hotels 37 Retail, furniture
7 Technical and Professional Services 36 Mining, Quarrying, Gas and Petroleum Extraction
8 Agricultural Production 35 Transport
9 Retail, foods 34 Electricity, Gas and Water
10 Financial Services 33 Retail, garden products
Creation
1 Retail, clothing 42 Wholesale, textiles, clothing and leather
2 Construction 41 Wholesale, agriculture, hunting, fishing and forestry
3 Retail, home improvement 40 Retail, jewelry, watches and apparel
4 Forestry 39 Other Manufactures
5 Retail, hunting and fishing apparel 38 Retail, machinery, motors and equipments
6 Retail, foods 37 Retail, leasing and renting goods
7 Financial Services 36 Agricultural Services
8 Retail, artifacts related to food services 35 State and Social Services
9 Retail, furniture 34 Retail, artifacts related to health services
10 Retail, bicycles 33 Retail, garden products
Performance
1 Retail, clothing 42 Other Manufactures
2 Construction 41 Mining, Quarrying, Gas and Petroleum Extraction
3 Retail, home improvement 40 Electricity, Gas and Water
4 Technical and Professional Services 39 Retail, office and school supplies
5 State and Social Services 38 Wholesale commerce, textiles, clothing and leather
6 Restaurants and hotels 37 Fishing
7 Retail, gas stations 36 Retail, jewelry, watches and apparel
8 Other Activities 35 Wholesale, metallic, machines, equipment and motors
9 Retail, artifacts related to food services 34 Retail, garden products
10 Wood Manufactures and Paper 33 Agricultural Services
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we used FUNDES-SII panel database to characterize firm
creation, destruction and performance in Chile. We have shown that, as
expected, larger and more productive firms are less likely to be destroyed;
and (also as expected) they are less likely to be created than smaller and less
productive firms. However, they are more likely to perform better in sales.
So, it seems they reflect the shocks of the economy on sales performance, or,
as we interpret in this chapter, in the execution of individual entrepreneurial
projects within the firm. For smaller and less productive firms shocks and
changes are reflected in survival, destruction or creation. We have shown
that "financial dependence" has different meaning for smaller firms, as re-
flected in a significant difference in sign of the corresponding parameter. For
them it is an indicator of "financial constraint" and acts in our regressions
as a predictor of firm destruction, of bad sales performance and a also as a
stronger predictor of firm creation than for larger firms. All of this evidence
seems to lend support to the general notion (and practice) in the literature
that size can be used as a proxy of financial constraints, but only, it seems,
for the smallest of firms.
We also show in this chapter that there is some evidence to support the
theoretical predictions of Chapter 1. In particular, there does seem to be
a margin of high productivity low capital firms that are very sensitive to
shocks. We also illustrate, in this Chapter, the high degree of heterogeneity
that lies behind our general regression results for the whole of the Chilean
economy. Finally we characterize sensitivity of firm flows as a largely urban
phenomenon that is mostly seen in the commerce and services sectors, in a
distant second place we find construction and the sector that is most used
by the literature: manufacturing.
Chapter 3
Fragility in Chile: The Job
Side
3.1 Introduction
The FUNDES-SII data set used in Chapter 3 had many virtues: representa-
tiveness, financial data, and sheer size. However it had three central defects
that make this chapter's estimations worthwhile. The first was that it was
constructed on the basis of a legal and not an economic definition of firms,
so we could be missing the most fragile parts of the economy. The second
is that it had no data on labor, so we had no way of measuring the social
effects of the firm flows documented. The third was thatdue to an adminis-
trative adjustment, the data set starts in 1999, right after the Asian Crisis
and it is not possible (at this point) to splice the data set with the one used
in Crespi (2003). So, not only is the data set relatively short in time, also it
does not allow us to look at the major shock that the Chilean economy has
suffered in the last 25 years.
In this chapter we document the effects on Chilean creation and destruc-
tion of firms of the Asian Crisis of 1998, from the viewpoint of job creation
and destruction. I will do this by using a new database consisting of a
moving panel of workers constructed from the National Employment Survey
(NES) of the Chilean National Bureau of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de
Estadisticas, INE). The most innovative aspect of this section lies in the
construction and use of this new information drawn from the NES of Chile,
which allows us to estimate job creation and job destruction for the very
first time, since it is the very first panel-like database of this magnitude (in
time and observations) for Chile.
In this data set the object we will analyze is "jobs" or "workplaces"
rather than firms. One advantage is that jobs are defined subjectively by
surveyed workers rather than legally by a government agency. This allows
us to capture much smaller and potentially more fragile firms, as well as
firm-like arrangements between economic agents. A serious limitation that
this data set has for the purposes of this dissertation is that it has very few
characteristics of these firms: only a very coarse measure of size and the
economic sector. Still, we will attempt to further our understanding of eco-
nomic churning and fragility in Chile by squeezing out as much information
as we can from this database, as the following sections will show: this turns
out to be quite a lot.
The Chapter is organized in the following way: Section 3.2 discusses
the data, its origins, advantages and limitations. It also presents the basic
stylized facts on Chilean job flows, more of which can be found in Appendix
A.1. Section 3.3 presents our main results on the differential propensity of
small firms to the destruction and creation of jobs, as well as bankruptcy
(which is a surprising bonus that we get out of this database). Section
3.4 tries to characterize the workers that are involved in this workplace
fragility and the sectors of the economy where it happens. We end with
the conclusions in Section 3.5. Also Appendices A.1 and E contain detailed
descriptions of the data and extended results that correspond to this chapter.
3.2 Stylized Facts on Job Flows
The first attempt to construct a panel from the INE database can be found in
Bravo et al. (2005) (we will call by the acronym BFL). In that version of the
paper the series of job creation and destruction are in quarterly frequency,
while now we have been able to disentangle them into a monthly frequency.
Hence, one of the main advantages of the INE-BFL panel: in Chapter 2 we
had six points in time (six years) from which we could derive five changes.
Now we have 111 points in time (37 quarters from 1996.1 to 2005.1 times
3 months per quarter) from which we can derive 108 changes. Also, the
time span includes the Asian Crisis, so we can infer some of the effects
that this mayor macroeconomic event had on the most fragile events. As it
turns out, from the viewpoint of smaller firms we have an additional relevant
macroeconomic event: the international liquidity squeeze that followed 9/11.
3.2.1 The Data Set
On average for a pair of consecutive quarters we have data entrances for
72,000 individuals interviewed from 19,000 households (in a country with
a labor force of roughly 6.3 million).' The data is representative of the
Chilean national job market and is properly weighted when calculations are
made. 2
Using this type of data has advantages and disadvantages in comparison
to the traditional approach of using data from manufacturing surveys. The
first advantage, of course, is representativeness. The broadest definition of
manufacturing accounts for just over 17% of Chilean GDP, 6% of Chilean
firms and around 13% of employment. This survey allows us to observe all
sectors of the economy, not only manufacturing. A second mayor advantage
is that the survey places the definition of "what is a firm" or "what is a
job" in the hands of the surveyed household, while industrial surveys rely
on legal definitions of what is a job, what is a firm and what is a plant. For
example, in this survey, informal firms (even ilegal), micro firms and self
employed workers are surveyed as job creators (although we will not count
self employment as jobs). The main disadvantage of using this type of data
is that there will be no financial information on the firms so we will have
to use size as a proxy for financial constraints. Moreover, in this particular
case we will only dispose of a very coarse measure of size. We will be able
to separate the database into self employed jobs (that we will not count),
jobs in firms with up to five workers (that we call micro), jobs in firms with
five to ten workers (that we call small) and jobs in firms with more than
ten workers (that we call medium to large). Modern definitions of what is
called a micro firm are based on sales rather than workers, but it used to
be frequent to call micro a firm with less than 10 workers. In this database
we basically two types of micro firms and the rest. In all the results of this
chapter we group the 0-5 workers category with the 5-10 workers category
and call "smaller" firms those that have less than 10 workers.
The INE by law deletes the identities of the individuals of each household
IThe original database has interviewes to approximately 32,000 households per quarter
and as data entrances for approximately 120,000 individuals. As Appendix ?? shows, the
loss of data due to the splicing of two quarters and the extraction of the short panel is
approximately 60%, but the resulting unemployment rate for Chile on the restricted data
set is almost identical to the original and official number for the country. This is a good
sign that the inevitable biases introduced by our methodology are not so significant as to
distort our econometric results.
2A more extensive explanation of the construction of the database, its virtues and its
defects, can be found in Bravo et al. (2005) and are summarized in A.1.
that is interviewed, but keeps the addresses. Each household is interviewed
six times in a period of eighteen months. We follow Blanchard and Diamond
(1990) and recover a series of short panels using the NES by statistically
matching individuals from participating households. The exercise allows us
to construct a series of short panels that enables us to calculate job creation
and destruction for different types of firms. Since the survey does not iden-
tify the firm where the worker is employed, we can only estimate minimum
job destruction and creation. We will be able to count as a job created
an observation that shows a worker that transits from unemployment, self-
employment or absence from the labor force to employment; or that changes
the economic sector of his firm. We will be able to observe as job destruc-
tion a worker that transits from a job to unemployment, self-employment
or absence from the labor force; or that changes the economic sector of his
firm. These two measures clearly underestimate job flows, since it is entirely
possible, and in fact quite likely, that there is a significant segment of work-
ers that change firms that will be identical from our point of view. On the
other hand, they are the first measures of this type for the Chilean economy,
and it is the best we can do for micro firms in this country.
3.2.2 The Stylized Facts
Panel (a) of Figure 3.1 shows the growth of the Chilean economy3 and
the unemployment rates for all quarters since 1996. Panel (b) shows raw
minimum job creation and job destruction as estimated from the NES with
our methodology.4 What we have calculated, for each month is the number
of jobs created and destroyed during the following quarter. So, for example,
if in panel (b) reports for January 1997 a 26% job destruction rate, it means
that 26% of dependant jobs existing in January had been destroyed in April.
As we can see in the first panel, there is a significant fall in the growth
rate of the economy during 1998-99 as a result of the Asian Crisis that
significantly deteriorated both the terms of trade and the interest rates faced
by the country. The economy enters a recession during the year spanning
3Chile has a monthly indicator of GDP called the Monthly Index of Economic Activity
(IMACEC) that is constructed by the Statistics Department of the Central Bank. The
table shows the cyclical component of the index that is calculated and reported as official
by the bank. More information can be found in the Central Bank of Chile's website:
http://www.bcentral.cl.
4We only include data up to and including all months of 2004 since the data for splicing
the 2005 quarters is not available yet. The data for the first three months of 2005 was
used to construct the flows for the months of the last quarter of 2004.
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from mid 1998 to mid 1999. However, the effect of this shock on job flows
is slightly more lasting.5 In the second panel we see that the events of 1998
and 1999 does not seem to have created a significant and permanent change
in gross labor market flows as hypothesized by some. Unfortunately we only
have data from 1996, but it seems that, if anything, job churning fell during
the 1998-2003 period and seems to be back up. The Asian Crisis seems
to have impacted especially on job creation rather than job destruction, a
stylized fact that we can see (in a lower scale) during the post 9/11 months.
During the disappointing 2002 and 2003 we see a sharp fall in churning that
reverts as the economy recovers during 2004.
On average quarterly job creation and destruction for Chile seem to fluc-
tuate around 28%. These are very high rates of job creation and destruction
by any comparison, but still in a range that can be believed if compared to
international evidence. For example Hall (2005) shows that on average since
2000, anything between 3%-7% of jobs in the US are separated every month
depending on the database source, which would give quarterly separation
rates of 9%-21%. Anderson et al. (1994) show that 23% of jobs are sepa-
rated each quarter and, more relevantly to our results, this rate goes up to
27% among firms with less than 20 employees (13% among firms with more
than 2000 employees) and up to 36% for firms with an annual payrolls of less
than US$4,000 per worker. Still, our data shows a Chilean job market that
is very fluid on average, a result that is consitent with other recent studies. 6
5The permanence of the increased unemployment rate drove some analysts to state that
the Chilean economy had endured a "structural" change in the job market. The Asian
Crisis and the Labor Reforms of 1999 were supposed to be the culprits. During 2005
(not included in the graph) there has been a significant fall in the unemployment rate, an
significant growth of the labor force and a sustained rhythm of dependant job creation. As
a result, the spin on a structural change of the Chilean job market has lowered in volume.
Also note that this period was characterized by an increase in the flow of self employed
and meso-formal workers transiting towards better quality and formal jobs. Hence, the
paradoxical increase in the unemployment rate and the number of jobs churned.
6Ferrada and Reinecke (2005) use a dataset of formal and relatively large firms that
are affiliated to the Chilean Security Asociation (workplace hazard insurance) to find that
26% of jobs are churned every year. This is much lower than we estimate, but, then again,
their database is composed of very formal and relatively large firms. On the other hand,
the newly established Chilean unemployment insurance system is already revealing that
every year 800 to 950 thousand jobs are churned, which confirms that our methodology
tends to underestimate job flows for Chile and that they are substantial. Each database
has its biases, in this case they are due to the fact that only new employees have to be
hired with unemployment insurance. In any case, the numbers seems extreemly large. The
mainstream hypothesis being spined however, is that there statistics are largely due to
an increasing number of firms that hire the same workers for repeated short periods with
the objetctive of minimizing the costs involved in a long term labor market relationship
Panels (c) and (d) show the X12 seasonally adjusted series and seasonal
components of creation and destruction for Chile. As we can see, there
is significant seasonality. In particular, job creation increases during the
second half of each year and is followed by an increase in job destruction
that usually happens in the transition from one year to the other. Visually
there seems to be an interesting symmetry in Panel (d): for creation, the
relative height of the high creation season seems to have fallen through
time while the depth of the low creation season seems to have increased in
time. For destruction it seems to have gone in the exact opposite direction
although the effect on the high destruction season is less clear. Finally Panels
(e) and (f) show the Hodrick-Prescott trend (A = 14,400) for creation and
destruction and the deviation from this trend. This seems to indicate that
churning was depressed during the low growth years of the middle of the
sample and seems to increase during the high growth periods (beginning
and end of the sample). However, we cannot be very categorical about this
stylized fact since we only observe one macroeconomic cycle in our data set.
Panels (a) and (b) of Figure 3.2 show the original series and the season-
ally adjusted series for creation and destruction in Chile for smaller firms
(less than 10 workers) and larger firms (more than 10 workers). There is
clear difference in the level of job churning among different sizes of firms.
Among medium to large firms, approximately 25% of the jobs are churned
quarterly. Among small firms it goes up to 35% which is strikingly similar to
the smallest size category in Anderson et al. (1994). It is also striking how
robust the difference between the two type firms is. The other interesting
feature is that for smaller firms churning seems to be much more volatile
and sensitive to the economic cycle. Panel (c) shows the Hodrick-Prescott
trend (A = 14,400) for the flow series of panel (b). Panel (d) shows the stan-
dard deviation around the HP trend for a centered mobile year. 7 Both the
creation and destruction of workplaces among smaller firms is more volatile
than for larger firms. Also, among smaller firms creation is clearly the more
volatile series. It is important to remember that we are showing stylized
volatility and not "sensitivity" or "fragility". To estimate these more causal
categories we need to do some econometrics. We do so in section 3.3.
We now exploit a useful question of the NES survey. The questionnaire
asks unemployed people when was the last time they worked, and if why
and evading social security contributions. I am not aware of any evidence to support this
hypothesis.
7Call ivt the HP trend and xt the series submitted to the filter. To calculate the series
of panel (d) first calculate yt = (xt - it)2 and then take the square root of a moving anual
average of yt.
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Figure 3.3: Destruction due to Bankruptcy in Chile
they lost their job. They are given four options: that the firms went broke,
that it downsized, personal reasons and other. We do not use the first ques-
tion to construct flows because of the very low answer rates (i.e. most people
answer the year but not the month). We do exploit the second question,
that has a higher answer rate, although much lower than the standard un-
employment survey questions. 8 This will of course, lower the robustness and
significance of the econometric results when compared to the other series we
have constructed. Still, we find some very striking empirical regularities.
In Figure 3.3, once again we decompose a HP trend and a cycle around
it that we summarize with a standard deviation for a centered twelve month
window. The number reported in Panel (a) of the figure is the percent-
age of jobs that were destroyed due to bankruptcy. As we can see, before
the Asian Crisis the proportion of job loss due to bankruptcy was roughly
double among smaller firms than among larger firms. The Asian Crisis
clearly makes them both increase but the increase is much more dramatic
among smaller firms. Before the crisis roughly 1.8% of jobs destroyed in
smaller firms were due to bankruptcy, since job destruction at that point
was roughly 36%, we can say that approximately 0.7% of smaller firms jobs
sThe NES is answered, about half the time by the housewife or mother of a household.
This may explain why this question is not answered so frequently. She might know if
the members of the household are or not employed, but not necessarily why they lost or
changed their last jobs.
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were being destroyed by bankruptcy. At the peak post crisis effect in late
2001 bankruptcies were accounting for 4% of destruction among small firms
which means that around 1.5% of smaller firm jobs were being destroyed
by bankruptcies. Among larger firms these incidences were much smaller.
Instead of going from 1.8% to 4%, bankruptcies increased from 1% to 1.7%
and since destruction among these firms is around 25%, bankruptcy destruc-
tion among larger firms went from 0.3% to 0.5%. We acknowledge that our
measure probably underestimates the levels of job destruction that can be
associated to bankruptcy. However, we have no reason to think that the
level difference of panel (a) or that the evolution of the two series could be
distorted. Moreover, there are reasons to think that firm bankruptcy is even
greater among micro firms when compared to medium to large firms, since,
the average micro firm has less workers. In panel (b) awe show the standard
error of the seasonally adjusted series around the HP trend. Destruction due
to bankruptcy volatility seems to be robustly larger among smaller firms.
The stylized facts of this section give us some reason to believe in the
predictions of the model of Chapter 1 that workplaces in smaller firms are
more sensitive to macro and sector shocks, and that destruction of firms
(bankruptcy) is much more likely, more sensitive and more volatile among
small firms. From the results of this section alone, however, we will never
be able to infer what it is size is a proxy for. For that we must refer back
to Chapters 1 and 3 of this dissertation. However, it could still be the case
that this reflects sector effects rather than any other characteristic of the
firm. In the next section we will submit this stylized fact to econometric
testing and find that it survives quite robustly.
3.3 Workplace Fragility and Small Firms
In this section we attempt to identify the effect of being a small or micro
firm on the probability for creating and destroying jobs. As we have already
pointed out the advantage of the INE panel we have constructed is that
it classifies as a job whatever surveyed individuals call a job. It can be a
job in a completely informal (even illegal) enterprise, it may be a working
relationship that has no legal or contractual expression, as long as it is
considered a job by the surveyed individual (and he does not consider himself
to be self employed) it will show up in our panel as a job that is either being
created, destroyed or is surviving a certain period of time.
3.3.1 The Framework
Conceptually we are assuming a Schumpeterian economy much like the ones
we can find in Caballero and Hammour (1996) and subsequent papers by
these two authors. These papers are constructed by modeling matches be-
tween labor and capital, rather than matches between ideas with capital,
which is what most economists relate to models of entrepreneurship. Chap-
ter 1 of this dissertation presents a model of entrepreneurship, but not the
model of matching of capital and labor that is most suited for the estima-
tions of this section. The simplest Caballero and Hammour model has a
new matching being feasible if there it is able to cover the returns to capital
and labor.9 Hence, it is efficient to create a job if
y(7, ¢, k, 0) >_ wk + w1 (3.1)
where y is the value added to be allocated between the to factors, and
{ wk, wl} are the outside options available to capital and labor. We also in-
herit for the model of Chapter 1 three determinants of the surplus that is
being divided between the factors: the productivity of the entrepreneurial
project into which the worker is being matched 7r, the size ¢ of the entrepre-
neurial project, k the proportion of investment that is covered by internal
resources of the entrepreneur, and 0 a vector of characteristics of the worker.
The central question of the Caballero and Hammour models is to study
how the specificity of capital, labor market institutions and regulations affect
the efficiency of Schumpterian creative destruction. This is not the central
issue that we study in this dissertation. However, the mechanics of the
model require a rigidity so that creative destruction is not instantaneous
and the churning of resources becomes what the authors call "sclerotic"
or slow. We need to believe that there is some level of sclerosis in the
economy for creation, destruction and churning to be interesting objects
that we regress against characteristics of either the firms or the workers. In
the name of simplicity we assume that capital is completely "specific" to
a particular matching, and, once committed, looses all of it's opportunity
cost. Since labor is assumed to have no specific properties, the matching
process generates rents of
s = y(7r, , k, 08)- w, (3.2)
9For the purposes of this chapter we choose to sketch the simplest Caballero and
Hammour model. Fully fledged models with complete discussions and specifications can
be found in their papers.
for a representative match. Assume that these rents are Nash bargained
and that A represents the relative negotiation power of capital. Then, the
returns to capital and labor in match j are
wk = As (3.3)
w3 = wJ+(1-A)s
and matches only become jobs if
As > Wk (3.4)
which, considering equation 3.2, implies
y(r, 0, k, 0) > +ý w (3.5)
and we will be interested in the object
P(Creation) = P (y(7r, 4, k, 0) - w- 0 (3.6)
The simplest way to understand the scrapping of matches in the Ca-
ballero and Hammour model is to consider the opportunity cost of labor
that is already involved in an enterprise. In a job market that presents un-
employed workers with a probability p of finding a job, the opportunity cost
of labor is
pwU + (1 - p)wl (3.7)
where wi is the wage in a matched enterprise while wl is the outside option
(unemployment benefits or home production). Hence, as long as the value
added of a preexisting unit is smaller than 3.7, that firm will be scrapped.
The main result of the model (which is not central to this Chapter) is that
the participation of labor in quasi-rents elevates the value of wi over the
outside revenue of labor wl for any representative firm, and hence, makes
the scrapping threshold more demanding. For us it suffices to notice that
equations 3.5 and 3.7 imply that a match will be scrapped if
y(ir, ¢, k, 6) 5 (1 - A)ps) + wI (3.8)
hence, we will be interest in the object
P(Destruction) = P (y(7r, 4, k, 0) - (1 - A)ps - wl _ 0) (3.9)
Finally we will also be interested in the particular case (of probability
p) of individuals that are churned automatically by the system from one job
to another. We will call this Schumpeterian churning.
3.3.2 The Probits
We have to remember that the origin of the data constraints the practical
specification that we can give to the equation to be estimated. Since the
origin of the data is the Chilean national employment survey we only have
a rough measure of size 0, and a relatively complete measure of the charac-
teristics of the worker 0. However, we do not have any direct information
on 7 or k. Moreover, as we have pointed out in section 3.2, the survey has
only three alternatives for the size of a firm: 0-5 workers,5-10 workers and
more than 10 workers. Moreover, the middle category (5-10) has very few
observations when compared to the other two. We choose to aggregate and
create a broader category of firms with less than 10 workers, the parameter
we estimate for this dummy will be the critical object in this subsection.
Hence, for equation 3.6 we estimate
P(Creation)t,f,i = F (3oYr + 031Mth + 020t,i + /3DSct,f + 04DSzt,f)
(3.10)
for firm f, individual i at time t. Our database has monthly data so have
year dummies Yr that we hope will capture some of the macroeconomic
fluctuations faced by the Chilean economy, and month Mth dummies that
we hope will capture some of the seasonality of the job market. We include a
vector of nine sector dummies DSc and a dummy for small firms DSz. With
vector 0 we exploit the main characteristic of the database: the extensive
characterization of the worker. Vector 0 includes years of schooling, potential
experience, potential experience squared, and a female dummy. Since we do
not have a measure of actual experience, we have to choose between including
a measure of potential experience (age minus schooling minus 5) or age, and
live with the fact that the interpretation is ambiguous. Since we treat this
variable as if it was experience we also include it's square to allow for a
concavity in the returns to schooling.
Similarly for equation 3.9 we estimate
P(Destruction)t,f,i = F (/oYr + /lMth + 020 t,i + / 3 DSct,f + /4DSzt,f)
(3.11)
only in this case the size dummy and sector dummy correspond to the char-
acteristics of the firm where the job was created while in equation 3.10 it
corresponds to the firm where the job was destroyed. This is a relevant dis-
tinction since there is a substantial number of observations where workers
are churned from one job to another, so they have firm characteristics both
for the destroyed and created workplaces. Moreover, we estimate a specific
regression for jobs schumpeterian churning that has the same functional
form:
P(Churning)t,f,i = ,oYr + 31Mth + ,20t,i + ,3DSct,f + /4DSt,f (3.12)
Table 3.1 presents parameter &4 for regressions 3.10, 3.11 and 3.12. The
complete output of the preferred regressions for the complete sample span-
ning all years can be found in Appendix E. To check for robustness the
table also presents the estimated parameters for yearly sub samples. those
regressions are identical to the ones for the complete sample only we drop
the year dummy.
Table 3.1 shows an extraordinarily high and robust level of significance
for our estimations (each parameter comes from the estimation of the model
for a different sample). For the whole of our sample we can say that a job in
a small firm has a 12.4% increased chance of being destroyed. From columns
2 and 3 we can see that there is a 3.7% lower chance of creating jobs in a
small firm and a 2.1% lower chance that a job is destroyed without leaving
the worker unemployed. Hence, Table 3.1 leaves us with three empirical
regularities for the Chilean economy. First, workplaces at smaller firms
are significantly and intrinsically more fragile, even when we control by
economic sector. Second, smaller firms find it harder to create workplaces.
Third, destruction of a workplace in smaller firms is more likely to create
unemployment, so that not only are smaller firms more fragile, but also
workers at small firms are fragile, and it is less likely that the job was
destroyed because the worker churned into a more profitable position in the
market.
If we glance at the results by year sub sample we find that 34 does seem
to have increased after 2001, but does not seem to change after 1998. The
parameter does seem to increase towards the second half of our sample. In
any case, the highest level for the parameter is 13.1% in 2003 and the lowest
is 11.5% in 1999. The &4 parameter for the creation regression (column
2) also seems to increase (in absolute magnitude) in the second half of the
sample. The &4 parameter for the churning regression (column 3) does not
Table 3.1: Parameter /4 from Destruction, creation and Schumpeterian
Churning from Weighted Probits (complete sample and year sub samples)
Sample Workplace Workplace Schumpeterian Destruction
Destruction Creation Churning by Bankruptcy
All years 12.36% -3.67% -2.12% 2.47%
(0.18%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.12%)*** (0.02%)***
1996 12.81% -3.70% -3.14% 1.97%
(0.56%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.39%)*** (2.14%)
1997 11.66% -3.60% -1.52% 2.07%
(0.55%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.39%)*** (1.80%)
1998 11.64% -3.49% -2.34% 4.64%
(0.55%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.38%)*** (1.84%)***
1999 11.53% -3.55% -2.49% 4.76%
(0.57%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.39%)*** (2.30%)**
2000 12.67% -3.42% -1.90% -0.08%
(0.54%)*** (0.04%)*** (0.35%)*** (1.70%)
2001 11.93% -3.63% -2.00% -1.06%
(0.53%)*** (0.04%)*** (0.35%)*** (2.02%)
2002 13.10% -3.51% -1.61% 5.07%
(0.52%)*** (0.04%)*** (0.35%)*** (1.74%)***
2003 13.17% -3.78% -1.85% 3.80%
(0.52%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.34%)*** (1.92%)***
2004 12.73% -4.31% -2.39% 2.58%
(0.55%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.37%)*** (1.69%)*
Note 1: table reports marginal effects of variables in a probit regression,
with standard errors in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance,** is 95% significance,
*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Re-weighting is done by rescaling the observations of the database
to preserve the number of observations so that standard errors are not
underestimated by artificially increasing the size of the sample
("aweight" command in Stata).
seem to have a any clear trend. In any case it seems that these parameters
are quite structural since they show so much robustness through time.
Table 3.1 could seem to indicate that employment in small and micro
firms is in retreat during the period being analyzed. This is in fact not
so, there is no trend at all and the importance of small and micro firms in
our panel seems to constantly hover around 26% once we take into account
sample weights and expansion factors. Since the regressions of Table 3.1
(and in fact all regressions in this chapter) are weighted, this cannot be
the explanation. 10 The explanation for the apparent discrepancy is twofold:
first the bases of columns 1 and 2 are completely different. The base of
column 1 is total workplaces for workers that have survived into our panel,
the base of column 2, on the other hand is total unemployed, self employed
and inactive workers, which is a much larger number. In fact the proportion
of workplaces to non placed workers in our database is 2 to 1. So, the
parameters of column 2 should be doubled to be compared with column 1.
In any case, this still seems to show that workplace creation is less likely
among small and micro firms. This, in fact, is a wrong interpretation of the
parameters, which are saying that given a workplace creation it is less likely
that it occurs in a small or micro firm controling for everything else. It is
possible, and in fact quite likely that the nature of business in some sectors
(like commerce and services) requires the creation of small and micro firms.
moreover, any Jovanovic (1982) style mechanical model of entrepreneurial
learning will predict that firms will tend to start small. Hence, the economy
will be creating small and micro firm jobs constantly. What Table 3.1 is
telling us is that creation in small firms will be more difficult ceteris paribus.
We also exploit econometrically a useful question from the survey where
people are asked why they lost their last job. This is the question we use
to construct Figure 3.3 in Section 3.2 where we suggest that smaller firms
seem to have had a greater sensitivity to the Asian Crisis shock, and that
this greater sensitivity is expressed in a larger percent of job destruction
caused by bankruptcies. We will now attempt to see if this result survives
a regression where we control for all other factors. So, we estimate
10It is important to point out that we are not counting as "jobs" the activities of self
employed workers. If we did that, and counted these workplaces as micro and small firms
we would find that 40%-50% of our workplaces were small or micro, which is a number
that is closer to public policy folklore that believes that small and micro firms employ 80%
of the workforce. It is also important to remember that in this chapter we are defining
small and micro firms by the number of workers. Folklore classifies firms according to
sales as we did in Chapter 2
P(Bkr/Dest)t,f,i = F (QoYr + 01Mth + /2 0 t,i + / 3DSct,f + 04DSt,f)
(3.13)
Where P(Bkr/Dest) is the probability of having been fired because of
bankruptcy, conditional on having lost a job. Despite its usefulness, one
of the problem that this question of the survey has is that it is answered
by very few workers. Of a total of 666,825 possible observations11 we only
have 60,957 that answer this question. This accounts for a sharp fall in the
estimated standard errors and the significance of the parameters of Table
3.4.
The fourth column of Table 3.1 shows us that bankruptcy is 2% more
likely as a cause for workplace destruction among smaller firms. This differ-
ence is significant with a confidence level of 99% and is on the higher range
of the differences we could infer from the stylized facts of Figure 3.3. How-
ever, what is most interesting is to look at the evolution of parameter /4. It
seems clear that the regression for the whole sample draws it's significance
from the post crisis years of 1998-99 (the Asian Crisis) and 2002-03 (9/11
Credit Squeeze). In those years the difference between smaller and larger
firms increased into the 4%-5% range which is much higher than what can
be inferred from Figure 3.3.
3.4 Who and Where Are the Fragile Workers?
3.4.1 Where are They?
In this section we try to characterize job creation, destruction and churning
in Chile across sectors using the INE panel database. In Chapter 2 we
have shown some evidence that most of the sensitivity to macro shocks is
explained by creation, destruction and performance of firms in commerce,
construction and services. First we try to measure sensitivity to shocks
of different sectors by setting up likelihood ratio tests similar to those of
Section 2.4 of Chapter 2. The test is set up by estimating:
P(Event)t,f,i = F (0oYr + f 1Mth + 020 t,i + 04 DSt,f) (3.14)
"Total observations in the database amount to 2,646,228. However, to be elegible for
this regression an observation has to correspond to a worker that has been matched in
two consecutive quarters and is working in the first of the two.
Table 3.2: Likelihood Ratio Test on Year Shock Dummies
Sample Workplace Workplace Destruction
Destruction Creation by Bankruptcy
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 24.87 *** 74.98 *** 23.63 ***
Mining, Quarrying 39.39 *** 12.90 28.35 ***
Manufacturing 34.88 *** 44:08 *** 25.97 ***
Utilities 9.11 25.18 *** 6.70
Construction 133.61 *** 87.46 *** 33.10 ***
Commerce, Hotels, Dinning 161.80 *** 63.34 *** 17.61 **
Transport, Communications 46.56 *** 37.00 *** 11.22
Financial, Prof. Services 70.85 *** 24.41 *** 22.52 ***
Non Financial, Pers. Services 68.85 *** 72.75 *** 17.90 **
Note: * is 90% significance, ** is 95% significance,*** is 99% significance.
for events in each sector and extract the log likelihood statistic for the com-
plete regression, which we call 11,; then we estimate the restricted regression:
P(Event)t,f,i = (0 1Mth + f20t,i + 34DSt,f) (3.15)
which is the same regression as 3.14 but without the year dummies (which
we hypothesize are capturing the macroeconomic shocks of this economy).
Again we extract the the log likelihood statistic, which we call 11,. Finally
we calculate:
LRT = -2(11, - 11,) - X(n) (3.16)
and this is what we report in Table 3.2. We will interpret the sign of this
test as an indicator of sensitivity of sector to shocks. The variables that
will represent shocks will be the year dummies, the importance of their
absence in the regression an indicator of sensitivity to macro shocks. The
month dummies will remain in the restricted probit to avoid measuring
differential seasonality, which, given the results reported in panel (d) of
Figure 3.1 that seasonality of job creation and destruction is a mayor feature
of the Chilean economy. In the table we observe that the year dummies
are significant at some level for almost all sectors in almost all probits.
Interestingly, both commerce and non financial and personal services are
among the most sensitive sectors to macro shocks across all types of probits.
Construction seems to be relatively sensitive in destruction and creation but
not so much in churning. All in all, there is some coherence between the
results of Table 3.2 and the results found in Chapter 2. However, there
are some discrepancies. It seems that one of the most sensitive sector in
workplace creation and Schumpeterian churning is Agriculture, Forestry and
Fishing. This was not observed in the firm panel of the previous chapter.
Moreover, in that database, firms from rural sectors were quite insensitive
to shocks. This means that firms in these sectors tend to be insulated in
these sectors but not necessarily the jobs they offer.
Table 3.3 reports the estimated 34 parameters for the three types of
probits for which we run a model of the sort described in equation 3.14
for each sector sub sample. The table shows that the small firm dummy
is highly significant in almost all sectors for predicting the probability of
workplace destruction. However, it also shows that the 11.3% marginal
effect that we estimate for the whole of the sample is actually an average
across highly heterogeneous sectors. For example, in Mining and Quarrying
small firms are 23% more likely to destroy jobs, while in agriculture, forestry
and fishing this marginal effect falls to 4.7%. Interestingly, this last sector
is quite volatile in job creation, and also has small firms being 75% less
likely to create jobs. Finally, the services sector seems to be the place were
being a smaller firms determines a very high propensity towards workplace
destruction and a very low propensity to creation. This is consistent with
the results of Chapter 2 that show services as one of the most sensitive
sectors with most firm fragility. Meanwhile manufacturing, which was also
a relatively volatile sector in the results of Chapter 2 is the sector where
firms have the highest relative probability of destroying jobs because of
bankruptcy.
3.4.2 Who are they?
The nature of this database allows us to study the demographic and socioeco-
nomic characteristics of the workers that are being subjected to the fragility
of workplaces in the Chilean economy. We will address this by studying
three characteristics of workers: (i) sex, (ii) age, (iii) years of schooling. We
report the results in Table 3.4.
The first row of Table 3.4 shows the full sample estimation for the female
dummy parameters. Table E.2 of Appendix E has the robustness check for
year sub samples and from it we can infer that the results are very robust.
Being occupied by a female does not make a dependant workplace more
likely to be destroyed or more fragile. However, if a job is created it is
less likely that it will be assigned to a female (controlling for characteristics
of the worker, see full regression in Appendix E). If destroyed it is less
Table 3.3: Parameter f4 from Destruction, creation and Schumpeterian
Churning Probits (complete sample and sector sub samples)
No. Sample Workplace Workplace Destruction
Destruction Creation by Bankruptcy
All sectors
1. Agriculture, Forestry
and Fishing
2. Mining and
Quarrying
3. Manufacturing
4. Utilities
5. Construction
6. Commerce, Hotels
and Restaurants
7. Transport, Storage
and Communications
8. Financial and
Professional Services
9. Non Financial and
Personal Services
12.36% -3.67% 2.47%
(0.18%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.02%)***
5.08% -75.75% -1.73%
(0.33%)*** (0.20%)*** (1.18%)*
25.75% 1.63%
(2.40%)*** (0.36%)***
15.79% -0.08%
(0.56%)*** (0.13%)
3.28% -1.61%
(2.74%) (0.93%)**
19.91% 0.64%
(0.81%)*** (0.17%)***
-3.09%
(4.30%)
7.35%
(2.18%)***
4.72%
(9.40%)
-1.84%
(1.96%)
7.99% 1.15% 5.66%
(0.42%)*** (0.08%)*** (1.27%)***
11.81% -0.39% 4.39%
(0.63%)*** (0.13%)*** (1.86%)***
13.05% -58.39% 6.36%
(0.81%)*** (0.70%)*** (3.73%)**
15.82% -67.75%
(0.36%)*** (0.30%)***
-0.67%
(1.28%)
likely that it was motivated by efficient reallocation and less likely that it
was motivated by bankruptcy. We anticipated these last two results since
females are expected to leave workplaces voluntarily to breed progeny. Still,
the result in column 2 indicates that firms do resist themselves to occupy
vacancies with females workers, but column 1 seems to indicate that they are
not noticeably discriminated against when deciding to destroy a workplace.
Schooling clearly makes workers less fragile (less probabilities of destruc-
tion and more probabilities of creation), although, curiously, schumpeterian
churning becomes less likely and bankruptcy more so. The effects of school-
ing on fragility are very strong. Schooling is a continuous variable that is
denominated in years, so Column 1 indicates that, for example, 5 years of
additional schooling lower the probability of workplace destruction in 4%.
Finally we show the effect of experience, which, in our specification is
captured by a level and a quadratic variable. Since the marginal effect of
experience is not linear we must represent it as a function, to understand
how we construct it represent the generic probit corresponding to any given
column of Table 3.4 as
P(Event) = F (a + 01X + 02X 2) (3.17)
where a represents everything else that enters the regression. We are inter-
ested in the marginal effect of experience which is
f (P(Event)\ aF
Yccompl ( ax (81 + 20 2X) (3.18)
complete
and we know that the marginal effect of the linear component of experience
(by itself) is
S(OP(Event)\ OF
VP 01 (3.19)
-• = ax partial 9X
and both vp and 01 are outputs that we can infer from the probit. Hence
we can calculate
vc = (01 + 20 2 X) (3.20)
01
We find that potential experience diminishes the probability of loosing
a job up to 32 years. Since average schooling in Chile is still only around
8 years, this means that, on average, people minimize their probability of
loosing a job (their workplace fragility) in Chile at 45. On the other hand,
the probability of entering into a new workplace is maximized at 26 years
of experience implying an age of 39. It seems quite clear that the concav-
ity of this variable is a result of it combining to different effects: age and
experience, and is a undesired result of not having actual experience and
being forced to use potential. Experience is probably always a plus. What
our results are saying is that the net effect of experience and age net each
other out at 45. After that age, each year makes the worker more and more
fragile.
3.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we used the INE-BFL panel database to characterize job cre-
ation and destruction in Chile. We have shown, as expected, that smaller
firms have a significantly increased probability of destroying jobs and a lower
probability of creating them. we have shown that when jobs are destroyed
in small firms it is less likely to have been caused by a schumpeterian re-
allocation of workers and more likely to have been caused by bankruptcy.
We also show that this differential propensity to bankruptcy is clustered in
periods that follow major macroeconomic shocks.
We show evidence that most of the creation and destruction volatility is
concentrated in urban industrias such as construction, manufacturing, com-
merce and services which is consistent with the evidence from the FUNDES-
SII database of Chapter 2, and that job creation is especially weak in small
service firms. We show that females are not more fragile workers, but are
discriminated against in job creation. We show that schooling significantly
diminishes fragility and that experience seems to have a net positive effect
(discounting the effect of age) on diminishing fragility up to and around 45
years of age (32 years of experience).
Table 3.4: Marginal Effect of Female Dummy, Schooling and Experience on
Destruction, Creation and Schumpeterian Churning from Weighted Probits
(complete sample and year sub samples)
Sample Workplace Workplace Schumpeterian Destruction
Destruction Creation Churning by Bankruptcy
Female Dummy 1.36% -2.80% -4.93% -2.47%
(1.86%) (0.03%)*** (0.12%)*** (0.00%)***
Schooling -0.79% 0.16% -0.12% 0.33%
(0.02%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.09%)***
Marginal Effect of Experience (v,) at:
0 Years -1.03% 0.26% -0.18% 0.17%
10 Years -0.71% 0.16% -0.17% 0.16%
20 Years -0.39% 0.06% -0.17% 0.15%
30 Years -0.07% -0.04% -0.16% 0.14%
40 Years 0.24% -0.13% -0.15% 0.13%
50 Years 0.56% -0.23% -0.14% 0.12%
60 Years 0.88% -0.33% -0.13% 0.11%
Peak Full Sample 32.32 26.39 192.04 161.65
Note 1: table reports marginal effects of variables in a probit regression,
with standard errors in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance,** is 95% significance,
*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Re-weighting is done by rescaling the observations of the database
to preserve the number of observations so that standard errors are not
underestimated by artificially increasing the size of the sample
("aweight" command in Stata).
Appendix A
Details on the Construction
of the Chilean Data Sets
A.1 Job Flow Data Set
The NES is a survey that measures the situation of working-age people in the workforce in Chile
(15 years and over). It is carried out on a monthly basis by the Chilean National Bureau of
Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas, INE) using the following procedure. The sample
is divided in to sixths that are equally representative of the Chilean labor market. Each sixth
of sampled households is interviewed six times during a period of eighteen months. The sets of
sample households are rotated so that, every time a set has been in the sample for eighteen months
it is dropped and replaced by a new sample. Therefore the same household can be observed six
times (spaced quarterly) for a period of one and a half years.
Households are first uniquely identified by address and then the members within a household
are identified by relationship, sex and age. The information does not make individuals uniquely
identifiable over time, since two problems persist: different people with the same characteristics
(which we term twins) and individuals with variables that have changed over time in more than
an acceptable measure. Twins are individuals within households with identical values for the
variable characteristics relationship, sex and age. If this effect is not considered, different people
could be matched as though they were the same person. In order to avoid this problem, twins
are eliminated from the matching process. The second problem is solved by controlling for non-
plausible changes in the same person over time in sex, age and schooling. As such, if the variables
age or schooling change by 2 units or the sex variable changes, they are immediately eliminated
from the matching process. The NES database is monthly, however, at this stage we only have it
as a quarterly database. In future work we will process this database in a monthly frequency.
Table A.1.1: Percentages of observations recovery over time
Quarters Ahead 1 2 3 4 5 6
Observations 73888 59760 47112 36079 25835 16965
Percentage Recovered 0.61 0.49 0.39 0.30 0.21 0.14
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Figure A.1.1: Unemployment Calculated From the INE Stock Database and the BLF Flow
Database and Quarterly Labor Market Flows for 1994 (in millions) calculated from BLF
The whole process involves the loss of a significant amount of households. Table 1 shows the
recovery rates (percentage of successful matchings in consecutive periods). The period analyzed
stretches from the quarter January-March 1996 to January-March 2004 and the recoveries are
calculated for the subsequent 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 and 18 months (quarters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6, respec-
tively). The average recovery rate for one quarter is 61%, dropping to 14% in 6 quarters. The
recovery would be 83% if all people were in the survey in both quarters. It should be pointed out
that the recoveries are consistent when different groups of individuals are analyzed, for example,
by sex, age, geographical region, etc. We must recognize that the loss of households through the
statistical matching process is probably not neutral. It's very likely that households that either
improve or deteriorate their labor situation significantly will change residence. We will just have
to live with this problem and be mindful of it.
Undoubtedly this process introduces some biases. It is highly likely that households that
either perform very well or very bad in the job market will change their address and, hence,
drop out of our database. Also, households that change their structure very much will look to
us as a different family and we will drop them, although performance in the job market may
determine important changes in the composition of the household (the children moving out or
in for example). A more extensive discussion of the biases introduced in this methodology can
be found in Bravo et al. (2005): BFL. It is basically impossible to check on this so, to see if the
resulting data set is still representative of the economy we calculate the national unemployment
rates and compare them with the official INE ones. This comparison can be seen in the first panel
of Figure A.1.1. The unemployment rates from the BFL flow database are slightly lower than the
official numbers, but very close. The fact that they are lower indicates that the predominant bias
is that households move or are substantially modified when there is an adverse job shock. So the
household that survive our calculations tend to be slightly better job market performers.
The second panel of Figure A.1.1 shows average labor market flows for Chile. It is important
to emphasize that this is the first formal paper that shows these calculations for Chile. One
stylized fact that worries policymakers in the country is the enormous proportion of the working
age population that is out of the labor force (47%), this absent labor force is mainly concentrated
among females and has become a major policy subject in the country. Another characteristic is
the high percentage of self employed workers (12.5%). Also note that the flows to and from self
PI
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Table A.2.1: Firm Flows by Year
From To Created Survived Destroyed
1999 2000 51,565 629,877 42,170
2000 2001 38,905 639,451 64,356
2001 2002 39,711 653,977 46,172
2002 2003 80,946 630,875 43,520
2003 2004 43,297 630,933 60,539
employment are almost as large as those in and out of the labor force and almost double those in
and out of employment.
A.2 Firm Flow Data Set
The data set of section 1.3 is composed of all firms that have filed in tax forms between the years
1999 through 2004. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has doted them with fictitious identities
that are consistent through time. Firms that do not fill in tax forms are assumed to have ceased
to exist. Legally, the IRS keeps them active for three years in case their legal identities have been
traded and are to be reused in other context. We count as a dead firm a firm that either reports
no sales or does not report at all. According to this criterium, the general flows of the database
are represented in the following table:
The database has the firms grouped by sector, as declared by the owner. Three things must
be pointed out. The first is that it is conceivable that a firm has activities in several sectors of
the economy. We reasonably asume, although it is not formally established anywhere, that the
entrepreneur will report the "predominant" sector localization of the firm. Second, some firms
change their sector from year to year (very few). We assume that this is just another expression
of the previous problem. Firms do several things, and, as the evolve and learn, they may change
the "predominant" activity that they do. Third, the original database reports 14 mayor sectors
and disaggregates commerce into 13 varieties of wholesale and 48 varieties of retail. In order to
control by the sector shock we aggregate into 9 sectors in the following way:
The aggregation of sectors we have chosen reflects those made in the official Chilean National
Accounts (CNA) with two mayor exceptions. First, in the CNA Agriculture and Forestry are
aggregated, so, for the sake of this table, we have separated them according to their participation
in sales in our database. Second, in the CNA commerce is usually aggregated with restaurants
and hotels. We have separated them, again for the sake of this table, using as weights sales from
our database, and reaggregation them by adding restaurants and hotels to services and leaving
commerce alone.
Table A.2.2 shows the differences that arise from counting firms or quantifying sales, as well
as the differences when counting value added. Agriculture and Commerce seems to be a sector of
more firms than sales or value. Mining, Manufacturing, Utilities, Construction and Services are
clearly the other way around: few firms, lot's of sales and a large value (particularly in mining).
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Table A.2.2: Aggregation of Sectors for Control and Stylized Descriptors
From To Firms Sales Value Added
average proportion
Agriculture Production Agriculture 9.8% 3.6% 3.2%
Agriculture Services
Forestry Forestry 0.6% 0.9% 1.1%
Fishing Fishing 0.4% 0.8% 1.5%
Mining, Oiling and Stonemasonry Mining 0.2% 5.2% 8.1%
Foods, drinks and tobacco Manufacturing 6.7% 16.0% 18.7%
Textiles and Leather
Woodworks and Paper
Chemicals, Oil Derivatives, Rubber
Metal Manufactures
Machinery and Instruments
Other Manufactures
Electricity, Gas and Water Utilities 0.1% 0.2% 3.1%
Construction Construction 5.0% 5.8% 8.6%
13 varieties of wholesale Commerce 37.9% 28.4% 10.6%
48 varieties of retail
Restaurants and Hotels Services 38.8% 36.2% 45.2%
Transportation
Financial Services
Technical and Professional Services
State and Social Services
Leisure and Free Time
Personal and Homestead Services
Other Services
Appendix B
Proofs for Heterogenous
Productivity Model
B.1 Derivation of Equations (1.4)-(1.9)
First notice that the cost of effort in the high effort incentive compatibility constraint is c - fq
which is the technological cost of effort minus the expected fine from shirking. In both the high
effort participation constraints and in the low effort incentive compatibility constraint the cost of
effort is only c, since in those constraints we are not considering the possibility of cheating.
Incentive compatibility to exert effort is satisfied if the firm is willing to expend effort at
const c - fq to increase the probability of success from pi to Ph, given that the firm has signed a
contract on the zero profit rate for high effort rph1 , hence:
(irW - (1 - k) rph1) p, (rW -(1 - k) rp) Ph - (c - fq) (B.1.1)
another way to see this condition is to say that Rich, the maximum interest rate at which a
hypothetical bank would be willing to lend to project (k, ir}, believing that the incentives of the
entrepreneur are aligned with high effort is:
i rW - (c - fq)(Ph - p) - 1  (B.1.2)
1-k
or that, at zero profit interest rate rph 1 for high effort, the minimum productivity at which the
bank will believe effort is expended is:
(1 - k)rPh 1 + (c - fq)(Ph - p1)-
rich = (B.1.3)W
which is our equation (1.9).
Participation compatibility within a high effort contract is satisfied if the net result of expend-
ing effort and reaping the higher expected value is larger than the outside option of depositing in
the riskless interest rate, hence:
rk < (rW - (1 - k) rph1) Ph - c (B.1.4)
another way to see this condition is to say that Rpch, the maximum interest rate at which a
hypothetical entrepreneur owning project {k, rr}, would be willing to engage in a high effort
contract is:
R -W - (6k + c)Ph (B1.5)
Rpch = (B.1.5)
or that, at zero profit interest rate rPh 1 for high effort, the minimum productivity at which the
bank will believe effort is expended is:
Spch - c)p (B.1.6)W
which is our equation (1.4).
Participation compatibility within a low effort contract is satisfied if the result of executing
the project with no effort is larger than the outside option of depositing in the riskless interest
rate, hence:
rk< (rW - (1 - k) rp1) AP (B.1.7)
another way to see this condition is to say that Rpel, the maximum interest rate at which a
hypothetical entrepreneur owning project {k, 7r}, would be willing to engage in a low effort contract
is:
S7: W - rkpE1  (B.1.8)1W - rkpRpcl = (B.1.8)
or that, at zero profit interest rate rPh 1 for low effort, the minimum productivity at which the
bank will believe effort is expended is:
-1
pcl = p (B.1.9)W
which is our equation (1.5).
Incentive compatibility within a low effort contract is satisfied if the result of executing a low
effort project is greater than executing a high effort project:
(7rW -(1- k)rph 1) Ph - c - (7rW -(1- k)rpl 1
) PA (B.1.10)
another way to see this condition is to say that Rbl, the minimum interest rate at which a
hypothetical entrepreneur owning project {k, rx}, would be willing to prefer a low effort contract
to a high effort contract is:
rW - c(ph - p()-1
Rbl = (B.1.11)1-k
or that, at zero profit interest rates for high and low effort, the maximum productivity at which
an entrepreneur will prefer a low effort contract to a high effort contract is:
7 c(p -bl) (B.1.12)
W
which is our equation (1.6).
B.2 Derivation of k and k with related proofs.
First, from equations (1.4) and (1.6) we can see that a sufficient condition for low effort contracts
to never be preferred over high effort contracts is:
c(ph - pI) - _ (r + c)Ph (B.2.1)
which ends up implying
c ph - pl
- -P (B.2.2)
r pl
or that the financial cost of effort is lower than the financial gain from effort.
Second, from equations (1.4) and (1.5) we can see that a sufficient condition for there to never
be a two tier economy in the absence of information asymmetry is that:
rp- • (r + c)p< h (B.2.3)
which ends up implying (B.2.2).
Third, from equations (1.4) and (1.9) we derive equation (1.10) retyped here:
k (C) ( t) - q)(p Phj )
so that for there to be a dual margin economy condition (B.2.2) must be satisfied.
Fourth, although it is redundant given our three previous steps, it is interesting to note that
from equations (1.5) and (1.6) we can see that a sufficient condition for the BL roof to be lower
than the PCL floor is:
c(ph - p) - 1  rp-1 (B.2.4)
which implies condition (B.2.2).
So summarizing, either ltpch Ž lTpcl b• ib and k Ž 1, and/or wbt 1 lpch Ž lrpcl and k • 1.
Hence if condition (B.2.2) is satisfied we will have an economy such as panel (a) in Figure B.2.1,
with the possibilities of a dual and tripe margin economies and tiers of firms. If not, we will have
an economy such as panel (c) in Figure B.2.1, with a unique participation constrained low effort
margin, two tiers, and the potential for a dual tier margin. Finally, panel (b) shows the case where
the financial cost of effort is exactly equal to the financial effect of effort. In this case there is no
dual margin, but rather a tier margin with a slope where it becomes easier for richer entrepreneurs
to qualify for low interest rates.
In panels (a) and (b), the kink in the tier margin kI is the intersection of (1.5) and (1.9) and
is
k CPh Ph (B.2.5)
r(Ph - pl) pl
and in panels (b) and (c) the tier margin Ik is the intersection of (1.6) and (1.9) and is
k = 1 fq (B.2.6)
r(ph -pI)
so that as fq --+ 0, and condition (B.2.2) is satisfied as an equality, k in both (B.2.5) and (B.2.6)
converges to 1.
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B.3 Derivation of effect 
of taxes and controls 
on
capital flows.
Consider an ad-valorem 
tax on capital outflows 
for residents of tout and 
an ad-valorem tax on
capital inflows of tin for 
non-residents. The ICH 
equation of (B.1.1) is recast 
as
(7rW -(1 - k) (1+tin)rpi)Pi 
• xW - (1 - k) (1 +tin)rph')ph 
- (c- fq) (B.3.1)
which means that (1.9) is now
7rich =
(B.3.2)
and is not affected by 
the outflow tax, since 
the ICH constraint compares 
two options that are
realized inside the economy. 
At k = 0 equation (B.3.2) is 
identical to equation (1.9), but 
not at k =
1, hence the pivoting movement 
shown in Figure 1.4. The 
slope of (B.3.2) is -(1 +tin)r(phW)
-
1
The PCH equation of 
(B.1.6) is recast as
(1- t,,ot)rk W -( 1rW (-k)(1 
+ tin)rp) Ph - c
which means that (1.4) is now
7rpch =-
((1 - t,,t)r + c - rk(tout + tin))ph
1
(B.3.3)
(B.3.4)
and is affected by both 
taxes since it compares 
options inside and outside 
of the economy. The
slope of (B.3.4) is -(tot + 
tin)r(phW)
- 1
. Hence, both ad-valorem 
taxes affect the slope 
of the
constraint in the same 
way, what changes is the 
point on which the constraint 
pivots. In the case
of the outflow tax it pivots 
on k = 1, in the case of 
the inflow tax it pivots 
on k = 0.
The PCL equation of (B.1.10) 
is recast as (B.3.5)
(1which - to)rk < (W - (1 k) (1 + tin)rp) now
which means that (1.5) is now
.
1-ý,A kh
I Itt
j
Fl~irlpd
i\i
-· 
\--11*1
(1-k) (1 + ti,,)rphl + (c - fq) (Ph - PI)-
100
((1 - tout)r - rk(tout + tin))pl (B.3.6)
lpc = 3.6)W
and is also affected by both taxes since it compares options inside and outside of the economy.
The slope of (B.3.6) is -(tout + tin)r(pIW)- 1 . The PCL constraint is affected in the same way
that the PCH constraint only amplified by the fact that p7' > ph .
B.4 Derivation of effect of microfinance policy a.
Consider an economy with a tax on capital inflows t. The ICH constraint with a microfinance
policy consisting of a gift of a(1 - k) to every entrepreneur of capital k is
(c - fq) (W - (1 (  - k) (1 + t)(1 - a)rph1) (Ph - P) (B.4.1)
which means that (1.9) is now
(1 - k)(1 + t)(1 - a)rph 1 + (c - fq)(ph - (B.4)-
'Irch = (B.4.2)W
and a marginal increase in a relaxes the constraint in
ar (1 - k)(1+t)rph (B.4.3)
Da W
so, the effect is larger for lower k.
The PCH constraint in this economy is now
rk < (7rW - (1 - k) (1 + t)(1 - a)rp) Ph - (B.4.4)
if the development agency is capable of verifying that the entrepreneur will use the subsidy to
complement his own funds in implementing the project. Otherwise, the PCH constraint will be
r(k + k(1 - a)) • (nrW - (1 - k) (1 + t)(1 - a)rph) Ph - (B.4.5)
and the PCL will be either
rk (rxW - (1 - k) (1 + t)(1 - a)rpt) Pl (B.4.6)
or
r(k + k(1 - a)) • (rW - (1 - k) (1 + t)(1 - a)rp•') p (B.4.7)
which means that the effect of a marginal increase in a on the PCS S E {H, L} constraint is now
either
ir (1 - k)(1 + t)rp (B.4.8)(B.4.8)
ca W
if investment is verifiable to the development agency, or
Dir (1 - k)trp' (B.4.9)
Da W
if it is not. Hence, the effect is lower and the development agency will have to either expend
resources verifying investment or make gifts to fewer entrepreneurs if it cannot verify the invest-
ment. Moreover, if there are no taxes or distorted access to international banking markets there
is no effect on the PC constraints in the nonverifiable case, and the only effects on this economy
are those created by the relaxation of the ICH constraint. Note that in this case (t=O) both
participation constraints acquire positive slope when a > 0.
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B.5 Proofs and derivations of effects of interna-
tional shocks.
Notice that all constraints have the following general form
Ox = ; Vx E {ich, pch, pcl, icl} (B.5.1)W
which implies that
- - (B.5.2)
OW W
since all firms in this economy share W, any shock to W will have a larger effect on the margin
composed by firms of higher productivity 7r. Since, in the three margin two tier economy PCL
is higher than PCH, we show in panel (a) of Figure (1.7) a larger contraction (upward shift) of
PCL. Moreover, ICH will contract more than constraint PCX whenever it is above and less when
it below. We know then, that ICH will shift upward in the same distance than PCH at k and in
the same distance as PCL at k. These two points indicate the new position of ICH.
From equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.9) we can derive the comparative static effects of the
interest rate hike as
1Oich (1 - k)ph (B.5.3)
Or W
irripch Ph_
Or W
a8 ipd l  Pl
Or W
so that both PC constraints will move up in parallel to their original positions, the PCL constraint
will move more than the PCH constraint and the ICH constraint will move the same as the PCH
constraint at k = 0 and will pivot on k = 1.
Appendix C
Proofs for Extensions and
Generalizations
C.1 Effect on ICH, PCH and PCL of amplifica-
tions of risk.
We can rewrite equation (1.14), by grouping the deterministic and random terms in the following
way:
EU(s, z) = EU (p (xr(W - (1 - k)rp;') - kr - qf(z, s)
S -cs + p-rv'w - (p,(1 - k)p;z + k) v,
Notice that when s = z this reduces to:
EU(s, a) = EU s p(W ( -( k)rp1) - kr (C.1.2)
so we can see that the effect of international credit risk vr is the same on both PC constraints,
no matter what the choice of effort s is, and the same for marginal firms of any productivity level 7r
that are the property of entrepreneurs of any wealth k. Now, an identical amplification of risk will
have a lower effect if it is applied on a higher initial level of expected utility. So, it is important
to remember that the base expected utility levels on the PCL and PCH curves are the same, that
is, zero. For this reason, the effect on both constraints of the amplification of international credit
risk will be the same. In the case of domestic institutional risk vc, only the PCH tightens since,
since cl = 0. The effect of domestic productivity risk will be larger on the PCH constraint since
it is amplified by Ph rather than pi. In the case we study in section 3.1, there is no slope on the
PC constraints, so all marginal firms will have the same productivity 7r, and the constraints will
shift in a parallel way and remain horizontal.
Now consider the case where s 0 z, which only makes sense when the entrepreneurs promises
more effort than he is willing to deliver, hence s = 1 and z = h. In this case, the term that
accompanies the international credit risk random variable v, is (pph1 (1 - k) + k) which is smaller
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than 1. Hence the effect of interest rate risk on EU(h,l) is smaller than the effect either on EU(h,h)
or EU(1,1) (remember, they are the same). The difference between these amplifications will increase
as the technological importance of effort increases. The implication is that the ICH constraint
tightens (since EU(h,h) falls more than EU(h,l)), but less than the PCH or PCL constraints.
Another difference is that these constraints are not amplified by the level of k while the effect
on EU(h,l) is. This means that for higher k, EU(h,l) falls more relative to EU(h,h) and hence the
PCH constraint will tighten less. Since limk, l(plPh 1(1 - k) + k) = 1 the ICH constraint will, in
fact, pivot on k = 1 as the interest rate risk amplifies, while the PCH and PCL constraints will
tighten in a parallel way.
Consider now the effect of the amplification of the domestic productivity shock v,. The
amplified risk will be larger if high effort is chosen, also if productivity of the firms is higher.
Hence, all three constraints will increase their slope, the PCH constraint will tighten more than
the PCL, and the ICH constraint will tighten less than the PCH constraint since the fall in EU(h,h)
is, in this case, ameliorated by the fall in EU(1,h).
C.2 Effect of Size on ICH with non proportional
effort and fines.
Consider the ICH constraint of equation array (1.23). The effect on 7rich of an increase in size 0
is:
alrich rph1k - (c - fq)(Ph - p)- 1
-- (C.2.1)8o W02
it is only positive if k > (c-q) ( Ph) a point that we have labeled ik and does not change
with 0. Hence, above k the constraint will tighten, and below it will loosen. Now compare k to k
of equation (1.10) retyped here:
k (= c) (Pp ) -fq ( P )
r Ph -P1 Ph - P1
hence, the ICH constraint will only tighten with size for entrepreneurs that are participation
constrained.
Appendix D
Complete Tables and Figures
for Firm Side Probits
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Table D.1: Preferred Probit Regressions Over Existing Firms: Probability
of Destruction, Extended Table
1 - k
Dsc
(forestry)
Dsc
(fishing)
Dsc
(mining)
Dsc
(manufacturing)
Dsc
(utilities)
Dsc
(construction)
Dsc
(commerce)
Dsc
(services)
t200 0
t 2 0 0 1
t 2 0 0 2
t2003
Obs.
LogPLike
Pseudo R2
full panel 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
-6.13% -5.53% -7.09% -6.56% -5.65% -6.07%
(0.08%)*** (0.18%)*** (0.20%)*** (0.21%)*** (0.18%)*** (0.18%)***
-0.00% 0.29% -0.28% 0.10% 0.13% -0.12%
(0.06%) (0.12%)** (0.13%)** (0.15%) (0.13%) (0.12%)
-2.23% -2.02% -2.67% -2.33% -2.02% -2.20%
(0.01%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)*** (0.02%)***
2.40% 2.39% 3.45% 2.71% 1.28% 2.32%
(0.36%)*** (0.74%)*** (0.93%)*** (0.87%)*** (0.69%)** (0.83%)***
2.73% 1.26% 2.99% 2.97% 3.48% 2.98%
(0.53%)*** (1.05%) (1.29%)* (1.26%)* (1.14%)*** (1.15%)**
4.29% 3.29% 6.34% 3.81% 5.06% 3.79%
(0.72%)*** (1.37%)** (1.91%)*** (1.70%)* (1.60%)*** (1.56%)**
-0.05% -0.10% -0.37% -0.16% -0.31% -0.14%
(0.14%) (0.32%) (0.38%) (0.35%) (0.28%) (0.31%)
1.84% 1.21% 5.45% 0.48% 1.41% 1.52%
(0.63%)*** (1.34%) (2.15%)*** (1.33%) (1.17%) (1.27%)
3.82% 3.15% 4.42% 4.06% 3.65% 4.01%
(0.22%)*** (0.48%)*** (0.58%)*** (0.54%)*** (0.45%)*** (0.49%)***
-1.06% -1.44% -1.94% -2.01% -1.98% -1.93%
(0.13%)*** (0.29%)*** (0.33%)*** (0.32%)*** (0.26%)*** (0.28%)***
1.93% 1.63% 2.17% 1.88% 1.87% 2.23%
(0.15%)*** (0.33%)*** (0.38%)*** (0.36%)*** (0.30%)** (0.33%)***
0.68%
(0.06%)***
0.31%
(0.06%)***
-0.04%(0.06%)
-2.23%
(0.01%)***
938,561 206,727 174,049 189,510 191,384 176,895
-199066.85 -41440.224 -37193.162 -42660.072 -39368.965 -38050.662
0.2095 0.2099 0.2464 0.2026 0.2018 0.1910
Note 1: Marginal effects on the probability of destruction, standard errors in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance, ** is 95% significance,*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Dummy for micro firms, Daz(micro) has been dropped.
' ' ' ' "' ~ " ' ` `
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Table D.2: Preferred Least Squares Regressions Over Collapsed Panels:
Amount of Creation, Extended Table
1-k
Dsec
(agriculture)
Dsc
(forestry)
Dsc
(fishing)
Dsec
(mining)
Dse
(manufacturing)
Dsc
(utilities)
Dsc
(construction)
Dsc
(commerce)
Dsec
(services)
t200 0
t 2 0 0 1
t 2 0 0 2
t20 03
Obs.
LogLike
R2
full panel 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
-6.14 -1.05 -1.11 -1.10 -1.25 -1.21
(0.27)*** (0.06)*** (0.07)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)*** (0.06)***
-1.49 -0.41 -0.24 -0.46 -0.43 -0.49
(0.24)*** (0.05)*** (0.07)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)*** (0.05)***
-12.80 -2.24 -2.48 -2.12 -2.33 -1.94
(0.60)*** (0.15)*** (0.15)*** (0.12)*** (0.13)*** (0.12)***
-3.40 -0.06 -0.18 -0.15 -0.27 -0.07
(2.03)* (0.04) (0.05)*** (0.05)** (0.05)*** (0.05)
-2.54 0.17 0.43 0.22 0.18 0.15
(2.07) (0.11) (0.16)* (0.11)* (0.11) (0.13)
-0.94 0.73 0.81 0.73 0.36 0.42
(2.04) (0.19)*** (0.22)*** (0.16)*** (0.17)** (0.15)*
-2.59 0.07 0.35 0.20 0.20 0.10
(2.00) (0.21) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.29)
-2.82 0.11 -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.05
(2.03) (0.02)*** (0.03) (0.03)* (0.02) (0.03)
-2.79 0.48 0.31 0.25 -0.55 -0.21
(2.08) (0.25) (0.27) (0.23) (0.21)* (0.30)
-2.74 0.13 0.16 0.26 0.27 0.24
(2.02) (0.02)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.03)*** (0.02)***
-3.00 -0.04 -0.12 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03
(2.02) (0.00)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
-2.80 0.13 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.11
(2.02) (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)*** (0.01)***
-0.24
(0.04)***
0.04
(0.04)
-0.05(0.02)*
-0.03
(0.02)
1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
-4305.75 -2987.63 -3070.15 -2976.80 -3000.91 -3005.87
0.7739 0.5972 0.6092 0.6657 0.6479 0.6318
I
Note 2: * is 90% significance, ** is 95% significance,*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Dummy for micro firms, Dsz(micro) has been dropped.
Note 1: Effect of increasing a decile on amount of creation, standard error in parenthesis.
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Table D.3: Preferred Least Squares Regressions Over Existing Firms: Sales
Performance, Extended Table
1 -- k
Dsc
(fishing)
Dsc
(mining)
Dsc
(manufacturing)
Dsec
(fishing)
Dsc
(utilities)
Dsc
(construction)
Dsc
(commerce)
Dsc
(services)
t 2 0 0 0
t 2 0 0 1
t 2 0 0 2
t 2 0 0 3
Obs.
LogLike
R2
full panel 1999-2000 2000-2001 2001-2002 2002-2003 2003-2004
3.38% 3.35% 3.38% 3.08% 3.34% 3.40%
(0.41%)*** (0.09%)*** (0.10%)*** (0.09%)*** (0.09%)*** (0.08%)***
0.30% 0.26% 0.31% 0.29% 0.33% 0.38%
(0.22%)*** (0.04%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.04%)***
0.71% 0.76% 0.80% 0.71% 0.48% 0.86%
(0.00%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.01)***
-1.48% -2.06% -1.17% -0.87% -1.48% -1.65%
(0.12%)*** (0.27%)*** (0.27%)*** (0.24%)*** (0.26%)*** (0.28%)***
-1.30% -0.93% -1.37% -1.24% -1.46% -1.49%
(0.15%)*** (0.34%)*** (0.36%)*** (0.33%)*** (0.35%)*** (0.29%)***
-2.12% -2.45% -2.71% -1.66% -2.49% -1.19%
(0.21%)*** (0.41%)*** (0.58%)*** (0.45%)*** (0.50%)*** (0.46%)**
0.31% 0.17% 1.42% 0.43% 0.51% 0.25%
(0.05%)*** (0.11%) (0.13%) (0.12%)*** (0.13%)*** (0.12%)**
-0.00% 0.66% -0.91% 0.30% -0.40% 0.41%
(0.18%) (0.34%)* (0.45%)** (0.41%) (0.40%) (0.37%)
-2.27% -2.82% -2.43% -2.16% -1.83% -2.12%
(0.06%)*** (0.13%)*** (0.14%)*** (0.13%)*** (0.14%)*** (0.13%)***
1.19% 1.03% 1.08% 1.26% 1.32% 1.20%
(0.05%)*** (0.10%)*** (0.11%)*** (0.11%)*** (0.11%)*** (0.10%)***
0.25% -0.29% -0.47% -0.25% -0.08% -0.19%
(0.05%)*** (0.11%)*** (0.12%)*** (0.11%)** (0.12%) (0.11%)*
0.15%
(0.02%)***
0.28%
(0.02%)***
0.18%
(0.02%)***
0.18%
(0.02%)***
862,798 192,249 159,782 174,075 174,119 162,573
969933.25 219258.79 179237.31 196236.78 193210.28 182696.50
0.0589 0.0667 0.0652 0.0585 0.0409 0.0786
Note 1: Effect of variable on sales growth, standard error in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance, ** is 95% significance,*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Dummy for micro firms, Dsz(micro) has been dropped.
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Figure D.1: Marginal Effect of 1 - k on the probability of default
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Figure D.2: Marginal Effect of 1 - k on creation
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Figure D.3: Marginal Effect of 1 - k on performance
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Appendix E
Complete Tables for Job Side
Probits
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Table E.1: Full Output of Preferred Weighted Probits (for the full sample)
Dependent Workplace Workplace Schumpeterian Destruction
Variable: Destruction Creation Churning by Bankruptcy
size dummy 12,36% -3,68% -2,14% 2,48%(0.18%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.12%)*** (0.69%)***
schooling -0,80% 0,16% -0,13% 0,33%(0.02%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.09%)***
experience -1,03% 0,26% -0,18% 0,17%
(0.01%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.06%)***
experience2 0,02% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00%
(0.00%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.00%) (0.00%)
female -0,14% -2,81% -4,94% -2,48%
(0.18%) (0.03%)*** (0.12%)*** (0.66%)***
sector 2 1,93% 81,42% 9,47% 4,02%
(mining and quarrying) (0.49%)*** (0.51%)*** (0.47%)*** (2.32%)**
sector 3 3,04% 73,74% 8,54% 0,93%
(manufacturing) (0.27%)*** (0.29%)*** (0.25%)*** (0.97%)
sector 4 13,01% 94,84% 20,35% -4,50%
(utilities) (0.91%)*** (0.38%)*** (0.89%)*** (1.79%)**
sector 5 15,17% 71,68% 10,03% 5,21%
(construction) (0.35%)*** (0.35%)*** (0.31%)*** (1.04%)***
sector 6 3,42% 65,61% 7,88% -1,54%
(commerce, hotels and restaurants) (0.28%)*** (0.34%)*** (0.27%)*** (0.92%)
sector 7 5,02% 63,90% 8,34% -2,24%
(transport, storage and communications) (0.34%)*** (0.42%)*** (0.32%)*** (1.01%)**
sector 8 7,87% 79,78% 13,42% -0,67%
(financial and professional services) (0.38%)*** (0.35%)*** (0.38%)*** (1.26%)
sector 9 -7,98% 71,81% -0,51% -1,46%
(non financial and personal services) (0.24%)*** (0.32%)*** (0.21%)*** (0.95%)
1997 dummy -1,41% -0,16% -0,35% -2,71%
(0.31%)*** (0.05%)** (0.22%) (1.05%)**
1998 dummy -2,22% -0,45% -1,17% -2,27%
(0.31%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.21%)*** (1.01%)**
1999 dummy -0,58% -0,46% -1,11% -0,60%
(0.33%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.22%)*** (1.14%)
2000 dummy -0,20% -0,63% -1,37% 0,44%
(0.31%) (0.04%)*** (0.21%)*** (1.12%)
2001 dummy -0,52% -0,61% -1,36% 1,90%
(0.31%)** (0.04%)*** (0.21%)*** (1.25%)
2002 dummy -1,03% -0,76% -1,49% -1,27%
(0.31%)*** (0.04%)*** (0.21%)*** (1.04%)
2003 dummy -2,13% -0,96% -2,05% -1,12%
(0.30%)*** (0.04%)*** (0.20%)*** (1.07%)
2004 dummy -0,17% -0,66% -0,76% -3,57%
(0.32%) (0.04%)*** (0.22%)*** (0.96%)***
February dummy -0,21% -0,08% -0,07% -1,47%
(0.36%) (0.06%) (0.26%) (1.08%)
March dummy -1,23% -0,31% -0,49% -1,65%
(0.35%)*** (0.06%)*** (0.26%)* (1.08%)
April dummy -1,82% -0,24% -0,48% -2,52%
(0.35%)*** (0.06%)*** (0.26%)* (0.97%)**
May dummy -2,41% -0,11% -0,34% -0,45%
(0.35%)*** (0.06%)* (0.26%) (1.26%)
June dummy -2,58% -0,03% -0,47% -1,76%
(0.35%)*** (0.06%) (0.26%)* (1.07%)
July dummy -2,14% 0,03% -0,10% -0,04%
(0.36%)*** (0.06%) (0.26%) (1.25%)
August dummy -2,45% 0,18% 0,14% -0,80%
(0.35%)*** (0.06%)*** (0.26%) (1.23%)
September dummy -2,71% 0,28% -0,12% -1,13%
(0.35%)*** (0.06%)*** (0.26%) (1.19%)
October dummy -1,11% 0,35% 0,45% 0,26%
(0.36%)*** (0.07%)*** (0.27%)* (1.32%)
November dummy -1,30% 0,24% 0,35% -0,24%
(0.36%)*** (0.07%)*** (0.27%) (1.24%)
December dummy 0,10% 0,07% 0,53% 0,57%
(0.37%) (0.06%) (0.27%)** (1.29%)
Observations 666,823 2,060,682 666,823 22,715
Log Pseudo Like -380260.66 -306569.35 -244230.15 -7457.7476
Pseudo R2 0.04 0.52 0.04 0.02
Note 1: dummies for January, 1996 and sector 1: agriculture, forestry
and fishing are dropped to avoid collinearity.
Note 2: table reports marginal effects of variables in a probit regression,
with standard errors in parenthesis.
Note 3: * is 90% significance,** is 95% significance,
*** is 99% significance.
Note 4: Re-weighting is done by rescaling the observations of the database
to preserve the number of observations so that standard errors are not
underestimated by artificially increasing the size of the sample
("aweight" command in Stata).
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Table E.2: Parameter for Female Dummy from Destruction, creation and
Schumpeterian Churning from Weighted Probits (complete sample and year
sub samples)
Sample Workplace Workplace Schumpeterian Destruction
Destruction Creation Churning by Bankruptcy
All years 1.36% -2.80% -4.93% -2.47%
(1.86%) (0.03%)*** (0.12%)*** (0.00%)***
1996 -0.07% -3.54% -5.80% -5.85%
(0.58%) (0.10%)*** (0.40%)*** (2.71%)**
1997 0.09% -3.30% -5.43% 2.47%
(0.58%) (0.10%)*** (0.40%)*** (2.05%)
1998 1.16% -3.01% -4.63% -1.71%
(0.68%)** (0.10%)*** (0.40%)*** (1.79%)
1999 -0.29% -3.16% -5.22% -5.86%
(0.61%) (0.10%)*** (0.41%)*** (1.76%)**
2000 -1.00% -2.69% -5.29% -4.53%
(0.54%)** (0.09%)*** (0.35%)*** (1.71%)**
2001 -0.25% -2.70% -4.84% -4.50%
(0.55%)** (0.09%)*** (0.35%)*** (2.14%)**
2002 -0.54% -2.37% -4.34% -3.30%
(0.52%) (0.09%)*** (0.35%)*** (1.50%)**
2003 0.07% -2.26% -3.64% -1.33%
(0.52%) (0.09%)*** (0.35%)*** (1.74%)
2004 -0.32% -2.45% -5.36% -2.47%
(0.54%) (0.10%)*** (0.36%)*** (1.51%)
Note 1: table reports marginal effects of variables in a probit regression,
with standard errors in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance,** is 95% significance,
*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Re-weighting is done by rescaling the observations of the database
to preserve the number of observations so that standard errors are not
underestimated by artificially increasing the size of the sample
("aweight" command in Stata).
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Table E.3: Parameter for Schooling Variable from Destruction, creation and
Schumpeterian Churning from Weighted Probits (complete sample and year
sub samples)
Sample Workplace Workplace Schumpeterian Destruction
Destruction Creation Churning by Bankruptcy
All years -0.79% 0.16% -0.12% 0.33%
(0.02%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.09%)***
1996 -0.55% 0.20% -0.16% 0.45%
(0.07%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.28%)*
1997 -0.54% 0.17% 0.00% 0.30%
(0.07%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.05%) (0.24%)
1998 -0.80% 0.17% -0.10% 0.43%
(0.07%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.23%)*
1999 -0.88% 0.17% -0.10% 0.10%
(0.07%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.27%)
2000 -0.87% 0.13% -0.15% 0.62%
(0.07%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.26%)**
2001 -0.96% 0.14% -0.20% 0.13%
(0.07%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.28%)
2002 -0.96% 0.13% -0.18% 0.25%
(0.07%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.22%)
2003 -0.75% 0.14% -0.13% 0.05%
(0.07%)*** (0.00%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.24%)
2004 -0.86% 0.17% -0.13% 0.45%
(0.07%)*** (0.01%)*** (0.05%)*** (0.21%)**
Note 1: table reports marginal effects of variables in a probit regression,
with standard errors in parenthesis.
Note 2: * is 90% significance,** is 95% significance,
*** is 99% significance.
Note 3: Re-weighting is done by rescaling the observations of the database
to preserve the number of observations so that standard errors are not
underestimated by artificially increasing the size of the sample
("aweight" command in Stata).
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